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JUDICIAL REVIEW
AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
DRYBONES AND ITS AFTERMATH
PAUL CAVALLUZZO*

INTRODUCTION
"The court of last resort
should not get mixed up in

the legislative process."'

This statement was made by A. S. Pattillo, a past president of the
Canadian Bar Association, after the Regina v. Drybones2 decision was
handed down by the Supreme Court of Canada. It was quite representative
of the conservative elements in the Bar who feared that this landmark
decision signified that the Canadian court was about to follow in the footsteps
of the United States Supreme Court and "make law rather than interpret it."
Meanwhile the liberal elements of the profession and the media hailed
this decision as a turning-point in Canadian legal history. They looked upon
the Drybones decision as a combination of the Marbury3 and Brown4 decisions in the United States. The courts would now oversee the actions of
Parliament even when it was acting within the jurisdiction assigned to it by
the constitution. As well the public could now meaningfully resort to the
judicial process for the protection of its civil liberties.
This paper will attempt to show that the Drybones decision is neither
an agent of apocalypse nor a vehicle to utopia. It is important in that it
appears to have given new life to the Bill of Rights which until this time had
remained dormant at the behest of our judiciary. Moreover it signifies that
our courts will play a greater role in our political system. Curiously, the decision arose in the "thick" of the debate of whether Canada needs a more
comprehensive, entrenched bill of rights which would be part of our constitution and apply to provincial laws as well. Needless to say, the Drybones
decision will have a significant effect on this debate.
The ultimate purpose of this paper is to assess the consequences which
Drybones will have in the Canadian legal system. It is broken down into five
separate sections. The first presents a historical analysis of the rival concepts
of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review. As well, we shall look at
*This article was written pursuant to the thesis requirement of the Masters of Law
Program at Harvard Law School, 1971.
1 Globe and Mail, Toronto, April 29, 1970, p. 5, col. 5-9.
2 [1970] S.C.R. 282.

3 Marbury v. Madison, (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L Ed. 60.
4
Brown v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483, 74 Sup. Ct. 686, 98 L Ed.
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the effects of a bill of rights on these two concepts in Canada. The second
section evaluates the impact of a bill of rights in a liberal democratic society.
In this part we shall question whether Canada needs a written bill of rights
in order to adequately protect our liberties. Moreover we shall discuss the
societal allocation of power which results from the implementation of a bill
of rights. Finally, a comparative analysis of American and Canadian civil
liberties cases will be presented.
The third section is a discussion of legal philosophy in Canada. It
describes the prevailing philosophy in Canada today as well as the jurisprudential change which, in my opinion, is taking place within our legal system.
This section also discusses the contemporary debate in the United States about
the legitimate role of the judiciary. Finally, some suggestions are made as to
the legal philosophy which our bench and bar should adopt in order to
provide Canadians with an adequate administration of the present Bill of
Rights. In so doing we shall answer whether Canada can afford a more
comprehensive, entrenched bill of rights at this time.
The fourth section consists of a detailed case analysis of the Drybones
decision. We shall also canvass the effects that the decision is likely to have
in our legal system. In this section an attempt is made to predict the probable
actions of the Supreme Court after Drybones. The concluding part of this
paper presents a theoretical model of judicial decision making for cases
arising under the Bill of Rights. Finally, this model is applied to the particular
facts of the Drybones case itself.
I
THE PARADOX OF CANADA'S CONSTITUTION
Since Confederation Canadian have suffered from an incurable identity
crisis. This state of mind was inevitable because of geo-political reasons. Our
nation is a "vertical mosaic" of Britons, Frenchmen and "others". These
others are becoming an increasingly significant third force which will necessarily aggravate this problem of identity. Moreover Canada was placed next
to the strongest and richest nation in the world. This, as well, has made the
search for Canadianism all the more difficult. Before we could decide who
we were, we were inundated with the values and lifestyle of our great
neighbour to the south. These were transmitted via the vast network of
American mass media to the majority of Canadians living parasitically on the
border. It is little wonder that it was a Canadian, Marshall McLuhan, who
first realized the powerful impact of the media.
Historically Canada has been a "buffer state" in the North Atlantic
triangle between Britain and the United States. Inevitably these two nations
have had a great influence on the make-up of Canada. This is clearly manifest in our constitution. Our parliamentary form of government is British.
Our federal political system is American. No doubt these two contributions
are compatible. However there are inherent institutional characteristics of
each which do conflict. Our concern in this part of the paper are the conflicting principles of parliamentary sovereignty and judicial review.
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It is unnecessary to emphasize the profound effect that Dicey has had
on our legal system. Most Canadian judges and lawyers have felt his influence
in their training as well as in their practise of law. His concepts of parliamentary sovereignty and the rule of law are deeply ingrained in our legal
order. They have directed the role our courts are to play in our political
system. They have directed the development of our legal system. However in
assessing the future impact of this legal theory, I would submit that Dicey's
concept of parliamentary sovereignty will become less important in Canada
while the rule of law will continue to be an integral part of our legal system.
The reasons for this will be canvassed below but there is one point which
should be noted now. I suggest that the Canadian Bill of Rights is the sword
by which parliamentary sovereignty will fall.
The present threat to this concept is no reason to dismiss it summarily.
As I said before Canadian judges and lawyers are steeped in its tradition.
Therefore one must understand its implications before he can fully appreciate
the present mechanics of our legal system. However because of the scope of
this paper it will only be discussed briefly. Besides it is a concept which has
been thoroughly dealt with elsewhere. 5
The most concise statement of its content can be found in Dicey:
The principle of parliamentary sovereignty means neither more nor less than this,
namely, that Parliament thus defined has, under the English constitution, the right
to make or unmake any law whatever; and, further, that no person or body is
recognized by the laws of England as having a right to override or set aside the
legislation of Parliament.6

Hence Parliament cannot by law bind its successors and no body, including
a court of law, has a right to overrule legislation of Parliament.
However Dicey does concede some limits to parliamentary sovereignty.
The most important is that Parliament, despite its supremacy, is not likely
to do an act which is politically indefensible. In effect there is indirect popular
control of Parliament. 7 Also conventions develop in the British legal system
which further dictate the actions of Parliament. For instance, it is customary
for a parliamentary government to resign if it is defeated on a no confidence
motion. Some further limits have been suggested by the critics of Dicey.
Professor Gray argues that
notwithstanding the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, Parliament can,
besides abolishing itself, limit its sovereignty and therefore 8bind its successors in
two ways, namely by prescribing the process of legislation.

These are the limits on parliamentary sovereignty as it applies in Britain
today. When applied to a federal state like Canada or Australia, the limits of
5 See W. S. Tarnopolsky, The CanadianBill of Rights (Toronto: The Carswell Co.,
1966) 66-89.
6 A. V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, (10th
ed. by E. C. Wade, London: MacMillan Papermac, 1961) 39.

7 This has been argued away by Dicey with his distinction between legal and political sovereignty. This distinction has been effectively criticized by Sir Ivor Jennings in
The Law and the Constitution, (5th ed. U. of London Press, 1960) 149.
8
H. R. Gray, The Sovereignty of Parliament Today (1953-54), 10 University of
Toronto Law Journal 54, 71. Also see Tarnopolsky, supra note 5.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 9, NO. 3

this concept are even more acute. Because of its division of legislative powers,
Dicey has even admitted that a federalism is necessarily based on the supremacy of the law, not of Parliament.9
Sir Owen Dixon, one of the greatest Australian judges, has argued that
"the rival conception of the supremacy of the law over the Legislature is the
foundation of federalism."' 0 An increasing awareness of the limitations of
parliamentary sovereignty as applied to Canada will no doubt dilute its effect
on our legal system.
At the outset it was asserted that our constitution bears two conflicting
principles. The conflict lies in Dicey's second principle which states that no
body could set aside parliamentary legislation. Of course this conflicts with
the principle of judicial review. Two questions arise from this conflict. First,
we must see how these two principles are reconcilable in our legal system.
Secondly, we must ask whether the decreasing importance of parliamentary
sovereignty will increase the effect of judicial review in Canada. To answer
these questions we must give a brief account of the history of judicial review.
By the time of the enactment of the British North America Act in 1867,
the concept of judicial review was firmly established in the United States.
Article III of the American constitution provides for a federal judiciary with
an indefinite jurisdiction:
1. The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish ...
2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution ...

The jurisdiction is indefinite in that there is no explicit grant of power to set
aside Congressional legislation which may conflict with the Constitution.
Moreover historians are not in agreement as to the intentions of the framers
of the Constitution on this particular issue." Whatever those intentions may
have been, Marshall in Marbury v. Madison'2 settled the question when he
said:
"It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what
the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases must of necessity expound
and interpret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.
So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that a court must decide that case conformably
to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules
govern the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty."

In effect in cases of conflict an American court is appealling to the natural
law since the United States constitution is steeped in the tradition of that
legal philosophy.
) Dicey, supra note 6 at 138-80.
10 O. Dixon, The Law and the Constitution (1935), 51 L.Q.R. 590, 604.
11 See P. A. Freund et al., ConstitutionalLaw: Cases and Other Problems, (Little,
Brown and Co., 1967) Ch. 1.

12 (1803) 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60, 177-8.
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The principle of judicial review is also provided for in theories of legal
positivism. 13 Kelsen has justified judicial review in the following words:
If the legal order does not contain any explicit rule to the contrary, there is a
presumption that every law-applying organ has this power of refusing to apply
unconstitutional laws. Since the organs are entrusted with the task of applying
"laws", they naturally have to investigate whether a rule proposed for application really has the nature of a law- Only a restriction of this power is in need
of explicit provision.14

It is a truism that the scope of judicial review in a British parliamentary
system is less than its counterpart in the United States. However it should
be noted that from time to time English courts have asserted a power to pass
judgment on the validity of legislation. The most powerful assertion was made
by Lord Coke in Dr. Bonham's case15 where he stated:
And it appears in our books, that in many cases, the common law will control
Acts of Parliament, and sometimes adjudge them utterly void: for when an Act
of Parliament is against common right and reason, or repugnant, or impossible to
be performed, the common law will control it, and adjudge such Act to be void...

Inevitably Coke's theory of natural law was struck down by the prevailing legal positivism in England. Both Bentham and Austin asserted that
in the absence of an expressed constitutional or legal provision, it could not
follow from the mere fact that a rule violated standards of morality that it
was not a rule of law.' By the middle of the nineteenth century Coke's
dictum had fallen into oblivion.' 7 At the end of the last century Maitland
disposed of it in the following words:
Just now and then in the last of the middle ages and thence onwards into the
eighteenth century, we hear the judges claiming some vague right of disregarding
statutes which are directly at variance with the common law, or the law of God,
or the royal prerogative. Had such come of this claim, our constitution must
have taken a very different shape from that which we see at the present day.
Little came of it ... The theory is but a speculative dogma ... IS

It must be admitted that this position has prevailed in Canada. This is
exemplified in the following statement of Lord Hershell in the Fisheriescase:
The Supreme Legislative power in relation to any subject matter is always
capable of abuse, but it is not to be assumed that it will be improperly used; 19
if
it is, the only remedy is an appeal to those by whom the Legislature is elected.
However it must not be assumed that any form of judicial review is

precluded in Canada. We must appreciate that there are two possible levels
of review in a federal state. One is the review of legislation when there is

no division of powers question. For instance an American federal court can
strike down federal legislation concerning a federal subject matter if it conflets
with one of the Amendments. Of course the same is true of state legislation.
It is submitted that this type of review is not accepted in most federal pari 3 See H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, (Oxford Press, 1961) Ch. 7.
14 H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State, (Harvard U. Press, 1946) 268.
15 (1610), 77 E.R. 646, 652 (K.B.).
16 See Hart, supra note 13 at 4.
17 See B. L. Strayer, Judicial Review of Legislation in Canada, (U. of T. Press,
1968) 3.
182 Maitland, Collected Papers, (1911) 481.
19 [18981 A.C. 700, 713.
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liamentary systems. The other level of review is the review of legislation when
there is a division of powers question. For instance the judicial overriding of
provincial legislation which is unconstitutional because it relates to a federal
subject matter. It must be admitted that this level of review has been traditionally accepted in Canada from colonial times.
Under our written constitution, the B.N.A. Act, the Supreme Court is
nowhere given a defined jurisdiction even to the extent that is provided for
under Article III of the American constitution. 20 Section 101 of the B.N.A.
Act does state that the federal Parliament may "provide for the Constitution,
Maintenance and Organization of a General Court of Appeal for Canada,
and for the Establishment of any additional Courts for the better Administration of the Laws of Canada." In no place in the Act is the court given the
power of judicial review at even the second level which we discussed. However by convention our courts do exercise such power. This has been established by the judicial review of colonial legislation to determine whether it
conflicted with the legislation of the Imperial Parliament. This judicial power
was described by one learned writer in the late nineteenth century:
It is the primary condition of all legislation by subordinate and provincial assemblies, throughout the British Empire, that the same shall not be repugnant to the
law of England. This condition is enforced by the local judiciary of the colony,
in the first instance, and ultimately of Her Majesty's Imperial privy council, upon
an action or suit at law, duly brought before such a tribunal, to declare and
adjudge a colonial, dominion or provincial statute, either in whole or in part,
to be ultra vires and void, as being in excess of the jurisdiction conferred on
the legislature by which the same was enacted...21

The basis for judicial review in Canada is not purely historical. There is
a practical reason why our courts must be the final authority as to the extent
of legislative power. This is because a federal state needs an impartial arbiter
to decide questions of legislative jurisdiction in order to maintain peaceful
relations between the local and central governments. Hence from 1867 until
the Statute of Westminster, 1931,22 when Canadian law no longer had to
conform to Imperial legislation, our courts had the power of judicial review
at both levels. That is to say they could review the laws of any Canadian
legislature, which was legislating upon a subject matter assigned to it by the
constitution, to determine whether it conflicted with English laws. As well
the courts could review the laws of a legislature which was legislating upon
a subject matter that was not assigned to it by the constitution. Needless to
say this anomolous situation did not give rise to judicial supremacy as the
British Parliament remained theoretically sovereign. Of course with the
enactment of the Statute of Westminster Canadian courts lost the power of
judicial review at the first level. Then their sole power was confined to the
second level, i.e. division of powers questions. If the court decided that the
subject matter of the legislation in question was within the jurisdiction of the
enacting legislature, then its job was finished. Parliamentary sovereignty
prevailed and no body could set aside such legislation. They refused to check
2

0 Its jurisdiction is defined in the Supreme Court Act, 1952 R.S.C., c. 259.
21 A. Todd, Parliamentary Government in the British Colonies, (2nd ed., London:
Longman Green and Co., 1894) 302.
22 22 Geo. 5, c. 4.
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the wisdom or fairness of legislation.2" Nor did they feel the obligation to
check the possibility of abuse of legislative power.2 4 The following words of
Chief Justice Taylor of Manitoba made in the 1890's, pretty well summed up
the position of Canadian judges:
I am not here to dispense justice. I am here to dispose of this case according to
law. Whether this is or is not justice is a question for the legislature to determine.25

It now becomes necessary to relate the aforegoing discussion to the
Canadian Bill of Rights. On first glance it appears that the Bill flies right in
the face of Dicey's parliamentary sovereignty in two ways. First, it seems that
by the enactment of the Bill, Parliament has bound its successors to pass laws
which do not abridge the freedoms declared therein. It is submitted that there
are two reasons why the Bill is not contrary to this aspect of Dicey's theory.
Because of the non obstante clause of section 2, successor Parliaments are
not in fact tied down by the Bill since they can pass laws which abridge its
declared freedoms as long as it is expressly provided that the laws are to
operate notwithstanding the Bill. Furthermore there are precedents for this
kind of legislation. For example section 4 of the Statute of Westminster
provides:
No Act of Parliament of the United Kingdom passed after the commencement
of this Act shall extend, or deemed to extend, to a Dominion as part of the law
of that Dominion unless it is expressly declared in that Act that Dominion has
requested and consented to that the enactment thereof.

As Professor Wheare points out:
...this provision does not deny future parliaments the power to legislate for
the Dominions, but it does lay down
a rule to determine when the power may
26
be deemed to have been exercised.

In effect Parliament has just dictated the "manner and form" of its legislative process. This is a limit on parliamentary sovereignty which had been
accepted before the enactment of the Bill.27 Moreover nothing in the Bill
prevents a future Parliament from amending or even repealling it by an
ordinary Act of Parliament. Hence it must be concluded that the Bill does
not conflict with the first aspect of parliamentary sovereignty.
The second aspect of Dicey's concept you may recall, was that no person
or body could overrule the legislation of Parliament. As you will see in a later
section, the effect of section 2 of the Bill is that it gives the court the power to
render inoperative any law of Canada which runs counter to the Bill of Rights.
This is judicial review at the first level since the court can now strike down
federal legislation relating to a subject matter assigned to the federal parliament by the constitution if conflict is found. Unlike the period from 1867 to
1931 it appears that the Bill of Rights has given rise to quasi-judicial supre23

See A. G. Ontario v. A. G. Canada [1912] A.C. 571, 583; Japanese-Canadian
case, [1947] A. C. 87, 102.
24 See Bank of Toronto v. Lambe (1887), 12 App. Cas. 575, 587; A. G. Canada
v. A. G. Ontario et al. [1898] A.C. 700, 712-13.
25 See Time (Can. ed.) Nov. 28, 1969, 13.
26
K. C. Wheare, The ConstitutionalStructure of the Commonwealth, (1960), 27.
27
Tarnopolsky, supra note 5 at 66-89.
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maCy. 28 However Dicey has not been completely rejected for theoretically
Parliament maintains sovereignty for the following reasons. Parliament
can circumvent the Bill of Rights by implementing the non obstante
clause. Moreover it can amend or repeal the Bill at any time by
simple Act of Parliament. Furthermore because the courts are creatures of
Parliament, it has the power to re-define their jurisdiction. But I would suggest that in practise parliamentary sovereignty is no longer a viable concept
in the federal sphere for it is politically infeasible for Parliament to assert its
theoretical sovereignty. As long as our courts meet the challenge of this
newly acquired power there seems to be no reason why Parliament's theoretical sovereignty will not be removed from our constitution by convention.
As well the paradox of our constitution will also disappear. But this does not
mean that we should completely transplant the American judicial approach
in Canada. 2 This country requires a unique approach to legal problems
because of the uniqueness of our society. Below I shall attempt to develop an
approach which in my opinion is most compatible with the court's increased
powers. Before that, it is necessary to turn to a discussion of the impact of
a bill of rights in a liberal democratic society.
II
CANADA AND A BILL OF RIGHTS
In recent years the protection of civil liberties has been a very topical
subject in Canada. International concern of human rights has increased since
the Second World War. A recurring news feature in our papers has been
investigations of human rights in totalitarian regimes such as Greece and the
Union of South Africa. As well we have seen concern over the plight of
prisoners of war in Vietnam or of "peace" in Spain and Russia. Canada has
also been inundated with reports of the recent application of the Bill of Rights
by the United States Supreme Court and its effect on the American political
system. Of course the reasons contributing to this increased Canadian interest
are not all external. Two very recent events in Canada will surely accelerate
the debate about a bill of rights. These are the Drybones decision, with which
this paper is concerned, and the implementation of the War Measures Act,
which suspended civil liberties in Canada in the autumn of 1970. However
these are only contemporary aspects of the debate which has continued since
the beginning of the last decade when our present Bill of Rights was enacted.
During the 1960's many federal-provincial conferences were concerned with
Mr. Trudeau's proposed charter of human rights which has far greater scope
than the present Bill. Our Prime Minister, as well as many other Canadians
believe that we need an entrenched bill of rights in our constitution that would
apply to provincial laws as well as federal. At a recent conference in the week
28 It must be remembered that quasi-judicial supremacy only prevails in the federal
sphere as the Bill of Rights does not apply to provincial laws.
29
Professor McWhinney has suggested special "American" factors in the political
success of the United States Supreme Court which explain why the American approach
cannot simply be transposed to Canada. See Federal Supreme Courts And Constitutional
Review, (1967), 45 Can. Bar Rev. 578, 591-93.
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of February 8, 1971, it appeared that there was consensus about the entrenchment of certain rights. This is the position in which we find ourselves
today.
It is no doubt that the debate has progressed to high intellectual levels.
However, in my opinion, two very fundamental issues have been glossed
over because they have been assumed to be "givens". It is suggested that
these issues must be resolved intelligently since their resolution must be the
basis of any approach which is proposed. These issues are inter-related. For
the purposes of intellectual clarity they are discussed separately in the context
of each other.
The first issue which should concern us is whether Canada needs a
written bill of rights. Of course we already have one in the federal sphere but
this is not reason enough to assume one is necessary. Moreover this question
must be answered before we invoke an entrenched bill of rights which would
also extend into the provincial sphere. The arguments for and against a written
bill of rights have been adequately dealt with elsewhere.3 0 In this section we
shall discuss only those which I believe to be fundamental.
The pre-amble to our written constitution provides that Canada shall
have "a Constitution similar in Principle to that of the United Kingdom..."
This did not tell us very much because Britain does not have a written constitution. Its constitution has been most clearly defined by A. F. Pollard in
the following words:
The British constitution is a miscellaneous, uncollected, undigested mass of
statutes, legal decisions, and vague understandings or misunderstandings some of
which have never been put down in writing.31

Apart from the meagre provisions for civil liberties in the B.N.A. Act
and other Canadian statutes, a Canadian's freedom in 1867 depended on
antiquated British statutory and decisional law. Even though this law was
not purely constitutional in nature, it was the basis of a legal system which
revered civil liberties. Indeed some assert that this "miscellaneous, uncollected,
undigested mass" has more adequately protected civil liberties than has any
other society.
Many Canadian constitutional experts have used Britain as a model in
rejecting the necessity of a written bill of rights. In the 1947 parliamentary
debates, the Right Honourable Ian Mackenzie, then Minister of Veteran
Affairs stated:
Let us never forget that we already possess in this country the rights affirmed in
Magna Charta on nineteenth day of June, 1215, the declaration of rights in 1628,
the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1679, and the great body, with its sweep and scope,
of common law. 32

Former Dean W. P. M. Kennedy of the University of Toronto Law School in
a letter to the Joint Committee of the Senate and the House of Commons
on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms held a similar view:
Although it is not therefore the question submitted to me, I do not believe that
a bill of rights is really necessary; I think that our "freedoms" are well enough
3

OTarnopolsky, supra note 5, at 12 - 13.

31
3

Pollard, Factors in Modern History, (1932) 176.
2H. C. Debates (1947) Vol. 86, 3188.
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protected in the ordinary law and, if this is not so, it ought to be possible to
change the law in the various jurisdictions to suit occasions. 33

Other experts have gone further and suggested that a bill of rights is
but a sham. Professor Dicey somewhat arrogantly described such documents
as "mere paper affirmations". 34 Professor Dorsen points out that "The German Weimar Republic had a written constitution and bill of rights, and this
not only was the vehicle for the rise of Naziism, but was used after 1932 to
provide an air of macable legality to the venal government." 3 5 Today such
totalitarian regimes as Rumania and Spain boast of written documents
guaranteeing the human rights of their peoples.
Does the fact that Britons are adequately protected without a constitutional bill of rights resolve the problem? Professor Frank Scott thinks not.
In his usual concise way he demonstrates why the British approach in the
Canadian context has limits. He suggests that Britain's lack of a constitutional
bill of rights depends on three factors: parliamentary restraint in legislation,
bureaucratic restraint in administration and a strong and live tradition of
personal freedom among the citizens generally.3 6 He points out that Canada
has not one but eleven legislatures to supervise. Needless to say this introduces
the problem of which government has jurisdiction over civil liberties. Moreover because of recent immigration Canada has many ethnic peoples without
this tradition of civil liberties. Finally Canada is a bilingual and bicultural
country which necessitates a uniquely Canadian approach to this problem.
One Canadian lawyer has gone so far as to suggest that the British
approach should be completely rejected. W. Glen How, counsel for the
Jehovah's Witnesses in the civil liberties cases of the 1950's writes that "the
unwritten British constitution means nothing more nor less than unlimited
legislative power.1 37 In his very interesting article Mr. How attempts to
demonstrate how ineffective it has been in protecting freedoms. He then
proceeds to make a somewhat sacriligeous statement for a Canadian lawyer:
Nothing in the Magna Charta prohibited the grisly practise of burning to death
those who disagreed with the majorities on theological questions. It did not prevent the abuse of the Court of Star Chamber; the despotism of the Stuarts; the
oppressive political prosecutions of the 18th and early 19th centuries; imprisonment without trial; trials by ordeal; executions in England, even of young children
for minor criminal offenses - these and a host of other outrages on humanity
occurred centuries after Magna Charta. So far as it is concerned they could all
happen today.3S

Unfortunately Mr. How's training as a lawyer seems to have prevented him
from giving intellectually satisfying arguments. Perhaps because he is such a
fine advocate he is troubled in presenting the other side fairly. The examples
which he has put forward are taken out of their context and put in a twentieth
century setting. He does not provide us with a comparative analysis. Would
3 (1948), 26 Can. Bar Rev. 711.
84 Dicey, supra note 6, 341 passim.
85 N. Dorsen, Frontiersof Civil Liberties, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1968), 16.
s F. Scott, Civil Liberties and CanadianFederalism, (U. of T. Press, 1957), 13.
37 W. G. How, The Case for a Canadian Bill of Rights, (1948), 26 Can. Bar

Rev. 759, 763.
88 Id. at 765.

19713

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

those rights have been more protected if Britain had what Mr. How proposes?
What was the comparative situation in the United States after 1789?"39
Surely he does not expect that his last statement is to be taken seriously.
Ironically, in his conclusion Mr. How does relent, however unintentional it
may be, when he states:
Magna Charta has been a talisman of freedom ever since 1215. By the 17th
century the general practise and customs of society had given the people40additional liberties probably undreamed of by the framers of Magna Charta.
I would finally like to present an argument that will logically lead us
into the next fundamental issue which we shall discuss. This is the hypothesis
of Professor Cah that no matter how courageous the man, "without an
authoritative text the modem democratic judge ...will certainly decline to
overrule or annul a legislative decision". 41 On the other hand Professor Calm
believes that a judge with a written document "feels equipped with legitimate
standards of decision and ready to perform his function independently and
manfully."42 We shall test this hypothesis in the final part of this section.
Before we do that and before we make any conclusions we must discuss the
next issue in the context of our previous discussion.
In answering whether Canada needs a constitutionally entrenched bill
of rights, we must advert to a societal allocation of power. In other words
which institution in our society shall bear the major responsibility in protecting our civil liberties. Is it to be the legislature or the courts?
Before we can answer this question we must discern the purpose of a
bill of rights. In a leading American case Justice Jackson elaborated his
conception of its purpose:
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities
and officials and to establish the legal principles to be applied by the courts.
One's right to life, liberty and property, to free speech, a free press, freedoms
of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections.43
39 "I am a fairly consistent reader of British newspapers. I have been repeatedly
impressed with the speed and certainty with which the slightest invasion of British
individual freedom or minority rights by officials of the government is picked up in
Parliament, not merely by the opposition but by the party in power, and made the
subject of persistent questioning, criticism, and sometimes rebuke. There is no waiting
on the theory that the judges will take care of it. In this country, on the contrary, we
rarely have a political issue made of any kind of invasion of civil liberty ...The attitude
seems to be, leave it to the judges. Years after the event takes place, the judges make
their pronouncement, often in the form of letting some admittedly guilty person go,
and that ends the matter. In Great Britain, to observe civil liberties is good politics
and to transgress the rights of the individual or the minority is bad politics. In the
United States, I cannot say that this is so." Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American
System of Government 81-82 (1955).
40
How, supra note 32, at 774.
41
E. Cahn, The Parchment Barriers,32 American Scholar 21, 34 (Winter 1962-63).
4
2 Id. at 35.
43
See Dorsen, supra note 35, at 4.
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In a somewhat less eloquent manner, Mr. Diefenbaker, the father of Canada's
Bill of Rights, described its purpose in the following words:
What would a bill of rights do? It would establish the right of the individual
to go into the courts of the country, thereby assuring the preservation of his
freedom. These great traditional rights are merely pious ejaculations unless the
individual has the right to assert them in the courts of law.44

Notice that Justice Jackson and especially Mr. Diefenbaker appear to un-

equivocally place the main responsibility of protecting our liberties on the
courts. Before accepting these assertions we must be assured that the institutional characteristics of our court system is better suited to effect the purposes
of a bill of rights than are those of the legislature.
There are many technical factors which suggest that our courts are
better suited. Because of its inherent nature a bill of rights is expressed in
very general terms. Of course it is the function of the legislature to declare
these rights. However it is suggested for a number of reasons that a court is
better suited to periodically define the scope of these rights. Civil liberties
are dynamic concepts which fluctuate from year to year. The legislature does
not have the political resources to amend a bill of rights annually. Nor is
the inherent nature of a bill of rights susceptible to such piecemeal amendment, especially if it is to be part of our constitution. Moreover the prestige
which our courts possess in Canada enhance the effectiveness of a bill of
rights because its expositions of rights are more likely to be accepted.
Canadians believe that our courts are composed of independent and impartial
judges who are not as susceptible to political pressures as legislators. Judicial
application of a bill of rights would in turn enhance the role of our judiciary,
especially the Supreme Court, as an educational body. On face it appears
that this reasoning is circular. What appears to be the conclusion is that the
Bill of Rights would be more effective if the courts were given the major
responsibility in administering it. Conversely, it is argued that the courts
would become more effective if it had this responsibility. I submit that these
two propositions are true if our judiciary has the ability to meet the challenge.
This topic will be our concern in a later section.
It has been argued that it is contrary to basic democratic principles to
allocate such power to an appointed, unresponsive body. However I suggest
that this argument holds little weight today. The proliferation of appointed,
administrative boards demonstrates that all democratic societies have accepted
such allocations of power. Professor Shapiro writes that the court is in fact
accountable and responsible to the public because of its duty to square its
decisions with reason and authority:
The necessity of justifying45every decision publicly is a restraint placed on few
other government officials.

Moreover for the most part, courts have in the past upheld our democratic
tradition by protecting the rights of minorities and by making the other arms
of government more democratic, especially the executive arm through the use
44H. C. Debates (1947) Vol. 86, 3197.
45 M. Shapiro, Freedom of Speech: The Supreme Court and Judicial Review,

(Prentice-Hall 1966) 28.
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of judicial review of administrative action. As Madison said when he argued
for the amending of the American constitution by adding to it a bill of rights:
Independent tribunals of justice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the
guardians of those rights; they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every
assumption of power in the legislative or executive; they will be naturally led
expressly stipulated for in the Constito resist every encroachment upon rights
tution by the Declaration of Rights. 46

Furthermore the powers that a court would wield with this responsibility is
often over-estimated. For a court could only assert this power when a dispute
arose or an advisory opinion was asked of it. The opportunity for a court to
assert its policy making powers would only arise sporadically. This certainly
limits any judicial usurpation.
Nevertheless the judicial power may be abused. This is the concern of
many great American constitutional jurists. 47 In cases of constitutional law,
which of course envelop the application of a bill of rights, Thayer argued
that a court could only set aside legislation when those "who have the right
to make laws have not merely made a mistake, but have48 made a very clear
one - so clear that it is not open to rational question.
"Judge Learned Hand ... by grudgingly recognizing a right of judicial review,
implicitly cautioned judges to exercise the power with extreme reluctance if
at all" 49 Justice Jackson seemed to agree with this approach when he deprecated the role of the courts in the following words:
... I know of no modern instance in which any judiciary has saved a whole
people from the great currents of intolerance, passion, usurpation, and tyranny
which have threatened liberty and free institutions ... I doubt that any court,
whatever its powers, could have saved Louis XVI or Marie Antoinette. None
could have avoided the French Revolution, none could have stopped its excesses,0
and none could have prevented its culmination in the dictatorship of Napoleon.5

Judge Hand went even further in the following statement in which he demeans
the effect of a bill of rights as well as the role of the courts:
Liberty lies in the hearts of men and women; when it dies there, no constitution,

no law, no court can save it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much

to help it. While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save it.51

However Professor Henry M. Hart points out the logical fallacy of Hand's
somewhat apocalyptic statement which:
assumes that there are two kinds of societies-one kind, over here, in which the

spirit of moderation flourishes, and another kind, over here, which is riven by
46
Dorsen,
47

supra note 35 at xiv.
See J. B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, (1893), Harv. L. Rev. 129; H. S. Commager, Judicial Review and DemoThe Virginia Quarterly XIX (Summer 1943), 417.
cracy,
48
Thayer as reproduced in Levy, JudicialReview and the Supreme Court, (Harper
Torchbooks, 1967) 43, 54. For a poignant criticism of Thayer's thesis see C. Black,
The People and the Court, (Prentice-Hall 1960) Ch. 7.
49
Dorsen, supra note 35 at 12. It is submitted that there is a presumption of
constitutionality in Canada. See B. Laskin, Canadian ConstitutionalLaw, (Carswell Co.,
3rd ed. 1966) 145-46. However it is doubtful that it extends to the limits suggested
and Hand.
by Thayer
5 0 Jackson, The Supreme Court in the American System of Government, (1955),
see Jackson, supra note 39.
80. Also
5
1 Hand, The Spirit of Liberty, (Dillard ed. 1953), 190.
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dissension. Neither kind, Judge Hand says, can be helped very much by the
courts. But, of course, that isn't what societies are like. In particular, it isn't
what American society is like. A society is a something in process - in process
of becoming. It has always within it, as ours does, seeds of dissension. And it
has also within it forces making for moderation and mutual accommodation. The
question-the relevant question-is whether the courts have a significant contribution to make in pushing American society in the direction of moderationnot only by themselves; of course they can't save us by themselves; but in combination with other institutions.
Once the question is put that way, the answer, it
5 2
seems to me, has to be yes.
As Professor Hart suggests, this allocation of power debate could be
resolved by rephrasing the question presented at the outset of this section.
Neither institution is to bear the major responsibility in protecting our liberties. However both have significant roles to play. Justice Holmes has said
"that legislatures are ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the
people in quite as great a degree as the courts." 53 The legislature declares
the rights enumerated in a bill of rights. More importantly, it should attempt
not to abridge these rights in the legislative process. The courts define the
scope of these rights and hence develop the law which protects our liberties.
To suggest that one has a more important role to play than the other
obfuscates the fact that both have complimentary roles to play in the protection of our liberties. Cries of "judicial legislation" or "judicial usurpation"
disregard this fact and may inhibit the court from exercising its legitimate
powers.
However we should not completely disregard the point made by Judge
Hand because of its extremist nature. His statement is valid to the extent that
the legislature and judiciary will be ineffective protectors of civil liberties if
their patron, the public, does not value their protection. Ultimately it is the
people who set the framework within which these two institutions work. As
Professor McWhinney said:
If the new Canadian Bill of Rights happens to correspond to deeply felt popular
sentiments no legislative majorities in the future are likely to interfere with it;
if it does not so correspond, then no amount of 'entrenchment' or any other type
of constitutional consecration can save it and put teeth into the paper guarantees.5 4
One of the most recent Canadian articles in this area will surely contribute to the quality of the debate in Canada.55 It was written by a political
scientist who has become a leading expert on the Supreme Court of Canada.
It is a realistic approach to the protection of civil liberties in a liberal democratic society. In Canada, as in the United States, it seems that the realist
tradition is being carried forward by the political scientists.
Professor Russell's thesis is that a constitutionally entrenched bill of
rights would be of minimal value in the protection of our liberties. A more
useful effort for civil libertarians would be to divert their efforts to increasing
52

See the remarks of Professor Hart in Government under Law 140-41 (Sutherland ed. 1956).
5a Dorsen, supra note 35 at XIV.
54 E. McWhinney, The Supreme Court and the Bill of Rights, (1959), 37 Can.
Bar Rev. 16, 19.
55 P. H. Russell, A Democratic Approach to Civil Liberties, (1969), 19 U. of T.
L. . 109.
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democratization in Canada. Two factors are invloved in this process. One is
the scale of government. Here he is concerned with the decentralization of
authoritative decision making. Of course, this proposal is not new. It has
recurred over the last three millenia in such philosophies as that of Aristotle,
grass root democrats or the New Left. How viable this approach is in a mass
technological society is for social scientists to show. So far they have had
difficulty in demonstrating that its benefits would outweigh the resulting costs.
The other factor which Russell discusses is the scope of government.
Here he is concerned with the range of social activities subjected to government control and regulation. In other words whether more or less government
is required to enhance liberty. He seems to be concerned about unnecessary
government regulation which inhibits the maximization of the individual's
capacity for self-development. Moreover he is concerned with government by
minority interest. He suggests that we can alleviate the unequal distribution of
power in our society by teaching our citizens the political skills of organization
so that they can increase their capacity for citizenship.
He then proceeds to deprecate the effectiveness of a bill of rights for
the following reasons that I will briefly outline. Professor Russell's prime
concern here is the shifting of responsibility from the legislature to the courts.
The policy decisions required in a civil liberties case should be made by a
legislature which is more democratic and hence more sensitive to public opinion. Besides these decisions should not be left to our courts because of the
type of man appointed to the bench and our traditional style of jurisprudence.
Furthermore an effective bill of rights might "enable the interests dominant
in national decision making to impose, through the judicial branch of government, their particular conception of civil liberties on deviant local legislatures", 6 at a time like today when provincial politics is as democratic as
national politics. He then suggests that a more effective means of protection
of our liberties would be an ombudsman-like institution or an agency such as
the Ontario Human Rights Commission.
Most of these arguments have been dealt with elsewhere in this paper.
However there are a few issues which are peculiarly Canadian in substance
that I would like to focus upon at this time. His argument about the imposition
of national values on local areas must be rejected. He does not seem to
appreciate that this process is not dependent on the existence of a bill of
rights. Admittedly this process occurred in the United States in the De-Segregration Cases. However it also happened in Canada in the Quebec civil
liberties cases of the 1950's without a bill of rights. Moreover in emphasizing
the value of decentralizing these decisions to the local areas, his argument
seems to lack critical morality. Surely Professor Russell does not see greater
value in decentralization than he does in the protection of minority rights
in the South or in Quebec. When he argues that provincial politics is as
democratic as national politics he shows an incredible naivete of Canadian
politics. Historically, it has been the provincial legislatures which have created
the greatest dangers to our liberties. Contrary to what Professor Russell suggests, this statement is just as valid today as is evident in Alberta and British
Columbia policy relating to Hutterites and Doukhobors.
56 Id. at 126.
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His thesis must be rejected on two other counts. First it is unfair for him
to imply that lawyers are not concerned with increased democratization in our
society. He has not appreciated the implications of the writings of many
Canadian jurists nor does he seem to realize what is happening in Canadian
law schools today. Moreover his analysis does not seem to appreciate the
democratic effect of a bill of rights which we have already discussed. There is no
reason why a bill of rights cannot be part of his programme of increased democratization. Indeed Prime Minister Trudeau who is the leading exponent of an
entrenched bill of rights has seriously attempted to increase the participation
of citizens in the decision making process. The increase of decentralization,
government restraint and public education does not preclude a role for a bill
of rights in a more democratic society. Secondly, in his analysis, Professor
Russell has fallen into the habitual trap to which most writers on this subject
are prone. He concentrates on the institutional problem of whether it should
be the legislature or the courts which should bear the responsibility in protecting our liberties. Hopefully by now the reader appreciates the inefficacy of
this approach. In the next section we shall turn to Professor Russell's concern
of the competence of our judiciary and the quality of our jurisprudence.
At this time I would like to apply Professor Calm's hypothesis that a
written bill of rights in some way gives a judge courage to more "independently and manfully" protect our liberties. Of course this could be the topic
of discussion for a whole thesis itself. Because of the limits of this paper I
have chosen to apply it to only a few cases, perhaps at the expense of oversimplifying the problem. However I believe that these cases shed some light
on the validity of Cahn's point.
The first set of cases that I have chosen go to refute his argument. The
two cases deal with legislation which in effect outlawed the advocacy of
communism in the ,United States and Quebec. In the first case the court had
a bill of rights in hand. In the second it did not.
58
In Dennis v. U.S.57 the defendants were convicted under the Smith Act
of "teaching and advocating" the doctrine of overthrowing the state by force
and of conspiracy to teach and advocate such doctrines. In the Court of
Appeals it was found that the defendants had effective control of the Communist Party which had as its general goal the successful overthrow of the
existing order by force and violence. The main issue in the Supreme Court
was whether the convictions violated the First Amendment. Over the rigorous
dissent of Douglas the Supreme Court upheld the convictions and hence the
constitutional validity of the Smith Act.
The Canadian case with which I would like to compare this is Switzman
v. Elbling (The Padlock Act Case.) 59 The Padlock Act purported to make
illegal the preaching of communism in houses in Quebec, and the printing
and distribution of literature propagating or tending to propagate these ideologies anywhere in the province. Before reaching the Supreme Court, the
Quebec courts had upheld the constitutionality of this legislation. The Supreme
Court found the Padlock Act ultra vires the province because the subject
57 (1951) 341 U.S. 494.
58 54 Stat. 670, 671, ch. 439, 18 U.S.C. (1946 ed.) 10, 11.
59 [1957] S.C.R. 285.
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matter of the Act fell under the federal criminal law power. Although the
case was decided on a division of powers point, the Court did allude to the
grave implications of such legislation. During the course of his opinion Rand
said:
Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under
self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the
degree achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective
shackles. Under that government, the freedom of discussion in Canada, as a subof interest and significance extending equally
ject matter of legislation, has a unity
to every part of the Dominion.60

In effect it appears that the Canadian Supreme Court, without the benefit
of a bill of rights, has more effectively protected freedom of expression than
its American counterpart. However before we reject Cahn's hypothesis there
are some possible limitations which should be mentioned which weaken the
validity of our comparison. The two cases were decided six years apart.
Dennis arose in the height of McCarthyism whereas the Canadian case was
decided in a more temperate era. Although Switzman was decided in the
Dulles era of brinksmanship it must be conceded that the fear of communism
at this time was not as irrational as in the McCarthy era. 6' As we know the
late 1940's and early 1950's revealed some serious communist conspiracies in
both Canada and the United States. Further it must be admitted that the role
the United States plays in international politics calls for a somewhat stronger
stand against communism than is required by a middle power like Canada.
Finally we must remember that the Canadian court was dealing with provincial legislation and the American court with federal legislation. Generally the
courts in both countries are less likely to strike down the legislation of the
central government. Moreover the provincial legislation struck down by the
in the DuplesCanadian court was part of the repressive policies6 implemented
2
sis era which the court had consistently overruled.
The next set of cases once again goes to disprove Cahn's hypothesis.
Similarly one case is Canadian and the other American. In the early 1950's
a Jehovah's Witness in Quebec City defiantly breached a municipal by-law
which forbade the distribution in the streets of the city of any book, pamphlet,
03
circular etc. without prior permission of the Chief of Police. When this case
came before the Supreme Court the defendant argued that the by-law was
unconstitutional as it infringed upon his rights to freely express his opinions
and it interfered with his freedom of religion. The conviction was set aside
for a myriad of reasons some of which related to the civil liberties issues. The
Court upheld the constitutional validity of the by-law but it found that the
regulation did not prohibit the Witnesses from distributing such literature in
the streets. In effect, Mr. Saumur's freedoms of expression and conscience
were protected by a Court that did not have a bill of rights as a standard.
60 d. at 306.

61 It should be noted that in Yates v. U.S. 354 U.S. 298, also decided in 1957, the
United States Supreme Court liberalized its position somewhat by distinguishing between advocacy of merely abstract doctrine and advocacy which is planned to instigate
unlawful action.

62See Saumur v. City of Quebec [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299; Roncarelli v. Duplessis

[1959] S.C.R. 121; Chaput v. Romain [1955] S.C.R. 834.
63
Saumur v. City of Quebec [1953] 2 S.C.R. 299.
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In comparison similar by-laws have been declared unconstitutional by the
United States Supreme Court. What can be inferred from these cases? Similar facts induced similar results using different legal tools. No doubt many
more cases can be found in which both courts similarly accepted or rejected
defenses based on civil liberties. Once again it appears that the presence of a
bill of rights does not effect more protection by the court. However it should
be noted that the American court did declare the by-law unconstitutional. This
seems to be a stronger position than the stand taken by the majority of the
Canadian court.
The final set of cases that will be discussed are the most useful empirically. They were both decided by the same court one year apart. Canada
uniquely provides ideal scientific conditions for the application of Calm's
hypothesis. For the Supreme Court of Canada has the advantage of a bill of
rights in cases of federal jurisdiction. Such is not the case in disputes arising
under provincial jurisdiction. A comparison of the Court's actions in both
fields should verify or disprove the hypothesis.
In a recent case Walters v. A. G. Alberta 5 the Supreme Court had a
civil liberties issue before it without the benefit of a bill of rights for a standard. The Alberta legislature had passed legislation which restricted the right
of Hutterites to purchase more land within the province. Even though there
appeared to be a denial of equality before the law as well as an infringement
on freedom of religion, the Court upheld this discriminatory legislation. The
Court did not question the justness of the law because it found it related to
land law which is under provincial jurisdiction.
The other case arose under federal jurisdiction which meant that the
Bill of Rights applied. This is the Drybones decision which is the topic of
discussion of this paper. As we will see the same court struck down federal
legislation which denied the defendant equality before the law. It seems safe
to infer that the Supreme Court in these cases proved Calm's hypothesis.
Although I admit the validity of Cahn's point I would suggest that there
is another variable which is more controlling than the presence of a bill of
rights. It is a major premise of this paper that the make-up of a court is the
most important factor in the protection of civil liberties by a court. No doubt
the presence of a bill of rights gives a court more courage in protecting
liberties. However it is suggested that if a civil libertarian philosophy prevails
in a court then a bill of rights is not needed for the adequate protection of our
liberties. In my opinion the 'implicit bill of rights" developed by the Canadian
Supreme Court in the 1950's is evidence of this. I would further suggest that
the Walters case would have been decided differently if it had arisen in the
19501s. Although a bill of rights may give courage to a court, it is its application rather than its existence which determines how our liberties will be protected. Below an attempt is made to show that a Bill of rights can have a
deleterious effect in our legal system if it is applied by a court which does
not possess the necessary, accompanying philosophy. It is now appropriate to
turn to a discussion of this judicial philosophy.
04See Cantwell v. Connecticut (1940), 310 U.S. 296.
05

[1969] S.C.R. 383.
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Im
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY AND THE CANADIAN JUDICIARY
In this section our concern will generally be legal philosophy and more
particularly the philosophy of judging. This latter aspect has become an increasing concern of Canadian jurists 6 and its interest will no doubt be
increased by the Drybones decision. The role of the judiciary in a democratic
society is by no means certain. Indeed it is uncertain because that role is a
dynamic one which evolves with changing political and social conditions.
However one thing is certain and that is that the judiciary has an important
role to play in the development of our legal order. The scope of that role in
the protection of our liberties is our concern at this point.
In the eighteenth century Bishop Hoadley in a sermon before George I
said:
Nay whoever hath an absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws
and purposes and not the person who
it is he who is the lawgiver
67 to all intents
first wrote or spoke them.

With this power did our judiciary adequately develop Canadian constitutional
law? Unfortunately the answer to this must be in the negative. Our judges
are steeped in the positivistic tradition. As it operates in Canada, this philosophy produces a mechanical application of the written law without regard to
social and political facts. This judicial approach is inadequate in the private
sphere but is even more inappropriate in the public sphere. Mechanistic positivism has no role to play in constitutional law. As Professor Friedmann has
said:
A predominately political document must be interpreted flexibly and general terms
6

in it must be understood in the light of changing social and political developments. 8

Our judiciary, but more in particular the Privy Council, failed in its role
as the interpreter of our constitution. The philosophical attitudes of the judges
effectively thwarted the development of the Canadian legal system. This was
dramatically displayed in the judicial review of Prime Minister Bennett's "New
Deal" legislation. 9 In my opinion, by its interpretation of the B.N.A. Act as
an ordinary statute the Privy Council had defeated the intentions of the fathers
of Confederation.7" In short the Privy Coucil has given credence to Bishop
Hoadley's words.
Canada has a great deal to learn from the on-going debate in the United
States about the role of the judiciary.71 The opposing philosophies may be
described, perhaps somewhat oversimplistically, as judicial activism and judi66

See generally the writings of Professors McWhinney and Weiler.

67See Hart, supra note 13, at 137.

68W. Friedmann, Statutory Law And Its InterpretationIn A Modern State, (1948),

26 Can. Bar Rev. 1277, 1293.
69 See generally W. H. McConnell, The ludicialReview of Prime Minister Bennett's
New Deal, (1968), 6 Osgoode Hall L. J. 39.

70For a contrary view see W. R. Lederman, The Courts and the Canadian Constitution, (1964), Introduction.
71
See generally Levy, supra note 48.
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cial restraint.7 2 This is not the place to comprehensively discuss the merits of
each philosophy. However a striking feature of the debate should be pointed
out. It is that both philosophies appreciate that a court at sometime will be
validly involved in "judicial legislation." The difference lies in the extent of
this activity. Most adherents of judicial restraint agree that the court should
play a major role in developing our legal system. They accept that the court
is a great educational institution. Because of its prestige, its decisions are
respected. In fulfilling its role the court necessarily creates law. However the
court should be restrained in creating law because everytime it does so it
endangers its prestige. The public looks upon the role of the court as one of
interpretation rather than legislating. The more it participates in the latter
function the more political it appears to the public which cherishes the independence of the judiciary. 73 If its decisions are without legitimacy then they
are rendered ineffective. As well, because of the limits of adjudication, the
court must be restrained in its law-making.
It can be seen that the difference is one of degree rather than substance.
Does this fact mean that such phrases are not useful in Canada? Professor
Robert Girard has argued that such labels
signify nothing more than their author either agrees or does not agree with a particular decision or group of decisions by the Court. If he thinks the Court should
not have interfered as it did, then you have 'judicial legislation', or even worse
'judicial usurpation' depending on the intensity of the author's conviction. If the
Court should have stepped in when it did not the result is 'judicial abnegation'.
On the other hand if the Court's response meets his fancy then you are blessed
with 'judicial restraint' or 'judicial statesmenship'.7 4

In a very witty way he has shown the dangers of such labels. However Professor Girard has missed the subtle advantages of such classification. Professor
McWhinney has described these in the following way:
Whatever the usefulness, therefore, of this form of classification for Canada and
the other Commonwealth countries in which the institution of judicial review
also exists (and I believe that this particular classification, inflexible and over72 For a defense of judicial restraint see the articles by Thayer and Commanger
in Levy or the books by Professor A. Bickel. For a defense of judicial activism see
the article by Rostow in Levy or Professor Black's "The People and the Court" supra
note 48.
73 This position is exemplified in the vigorous dissenting opinion of Justice Frankfurter in Baker v. Carr 394 U.S. 186 reproduced in Freund et al. supra note 11 at
1180, 1191.
"The Court's authority-possessed of neither the purse nor the sword-ultimately
rests on sustained public confidence in its moral sanction. Such feeling must be
nourished by the Court's complete detachment, in fact and in appearance, from
political entanglements and by abstention from injecting itself into the clash of
political forces in political settlements."
The opposing view was stated By Justice Clark in a concurring opinion in the same
case, at p. 1191:
"It is well for the Court to practise self-restraint and discipline in constitutional
adjudication, but never in its history have those principles received sanction where
the national rights of so many have been so clearly infringed for so long a time.
National respect for the courts is more enhanced through the forthright enforcement of those rights rather than by rendering them nugatory through the interposition of subterfuges. In my view the ultimate decision today is in the greatest
tradition of this Court..."
74Book Review, (1959), 11 Stan L Rev 800, 804.
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simpiffied as it may be, has still some usefulness for the Commonwealth countries
in clarifying thinking about judicial thought-ways), it is clearly only the beginning
of wisdom in the analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence in the United States.
The wise constitutional judge needs to be familiar with and able to apply the
advantages of both restraint and activism; he needs to know when to favor the
one approach and when the other; he needs, in fact, to make an ally of timeto know when to decide and when not to decide, and when to enunciate a broad
principle
and when to decide a particular problem-situation narrowly on the
facts. 75

Hence this classification emphasizes the dynamic nature of the role of
a court. There is a time for judicial activism as there is for restraint. Despite
its mechanical interpretation of our constitution, the Privy Council in some
cases did recognize that its role was dynamic. For instance when it implied
the power in the federal government to adequately deal with the emergency
conditions created by the two wars it exercised 'judicial restraint' as it deferred
to the legislative judgement as to the existence of an emergency. 76 Or, when
it struck down much of Bennett's New Deal legislation it exercised 'judicial
activism' because it was concerned with the effect that this comprehensive
legislative programme would have on the federal nature of Canada. 77 However many Canadian commentators would question the Privy Council's timing
in both periods. In my opinion the Supreme Court of Canada more ably
appreciated the times necessary for judicial activism. This is especially true
in the civil liberties cases of the 1950's some of which were discussed above.
It must be agreed that there are institutional limitations of a court which
require it to be restrained at most times. For example because of its method
of data gathering it is less equipped than is a legislature to make policy decisions. It does not have access to all the relevant evidence because of its evidentiary rules and because it only receives evidence from two interested
parties. Even if it did have the required evidence before it, judges do not
necessarily have the expertise to evaluate it. Moreover because it is a nonelective body "judges simply are not as capable of registering and reflecting
the sentiments of a majority of citizens which, it is believed, should be the
prime determinant of the social policies embodied in our laws". 78 However
this is not to say that judicial restraint is equivalent to mechanistic positivism.
Judicial restraint requires creativity in that a court must make its decision in
light of social and political realities. It also requires the intelligence and
courage to recognize situations when the court must take an active role in
developing our law. This is especially true in the application of a bill of rights
which requires that a court rigorously protect our liberties.
This "creative judicial restraint" suggests that our court must change its
approach in its interpretation of political documents like the Bill. The most
important change should be in its means of interpretation. Because of the
75 E. McWhinney, The Great Debate: Activism and Self-Restraint and Current
Dilemmas in Judicial Policy-Making, (1958), 33 N.Y.U.L.R. 775, 794.
76 See Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. Ltd.
[1923] A.C. 695: Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A. G. Canada
[1947] A.C. 87.
77 See supra note 69.
78 p.

Rev. 1, 6.

C. Weiler, Legal Values and Judicial Decision Making, (1970), 48 Can. Bar
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inherent nature of a bill of rights, the court must be more flexible in its statutory interpretation. In order to adequately appreciate the social interests
involved in a civil liberties issue, the court must resort to external aids. This
was not done in Drybones and the result was an inadequate decision for
reasons which will be elaborated below. However the court should be limited
by traditional constitutional principles. For instance there should be a presumption of constitutionality, i.e. a presumption that the legislation in question
is not in conflict with the Bill. This should be especially true of a case arising
under the Canadian Bill since section 3 explicitly requires the Minister of
Justice to examine every piece of federal legislation before it is enacted to
ascertain whether it abridges any declared rights. The courts should decide
cases narrowly under the Bill as the majority attempted to do in Drybones
but failed. Finally the court should not decide the case on a Bill of Rights
issue, if another ground can be rationally relied upon. But when such is not
the case the Court must apply the Bill rigorously so that our liberties are
protected. As Justice Rand said:
The rule of the judiciary in preserving freedoms is not sufficiently ascertained by

a mere statement of jurisdiction, we must examine that rule in action. They can
be preserved only through a judicial administration which, by intelligence, courage
and unremitting vigilance maintains their standards inviolate. But as the first
condition of such functioning the judicial mind must itself be free3 9

No doubt it is not only the judges that will have to improve their performance in constitutional adjudication. As Bentham said: "The law is not
made by judge alone, but by judge and company." The Canadian Bar must
present the kind of arguments that are ammenable to the type of decision that
this paper calls for. Until now Canadian lawyers were not prepared to present such arguments because of their training and because the courts were
likely to reject such submissions. However it is suggested that future lawyers
in Canada will be capable of presenting such arguments because of the
improving quality of legal education. Today most professors in Canadian
law schools have pursued their graduate studies in the United States unlike
in the past when Britain was the Mecca for legal scholars. Their tradition is
becoming more noticeably American as are their teaching methods and
materials. The realist and sociological schools of jurisprudence have won, or
at least are winning the battle of jurisprudence in the leading Canadian law
schools over mechanistic positivism. Austinean theory is studied but only as
a vehicle for comparison. The positivist theories which maintain any credence in our law schools are those of legal philosophers such as H.L.A. Hart
and Hans Kelsen which are far more sophisticated than the positivism which
prevails in Canada today. It seems likely that our future lawyers, judges and
legislators, and hence our legal system will reflect this jurisprudential metamorphisis.
It is fortuitous that the Drybones case was decided while Canadian
legal philosophy is in the process of change. This is fortunate for the reasons
discussed above. However this process is not complete. It is suggested that
the men on the bench today are not totally competent to assert the new
power which has been given to them nor are most lawyers capable of aiding
70 I. Rand, The Role of an Independent Judiciary in Preserving Freedom, (1951),
9 U. of T. L.J. 1, 5.
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the court in exercising this power. The Drybones case is evidence of this.
I would recommend that Canada not constitutionally entrench a bill of rights
in the near future. We must see how our present bench and bar deal with the
existing Bill. Perhaps they will meet the challenge of this new power. But
this is not reason enough to proceed and enact a more comprehensive bill.
As we have seen a bill of rights has educational value. If the public witnesses
an inadequate application of this new bill then its value is lost. For reasons
already outlined the judicial power under the present bill is limited as is its
impact on the public. Before we expand this power we should await and
observe the performance of the court under its present power. It is to be
hoped that experience will increase its competence to operate in its new
jurisdiction. Moreover, the next generation of lawyers will surely enhance
the court's competence to assert its new power. At this time, and only at this
time, will Canada be ready for a constitutionally entrenched bill of rights.
It has been emphasized throughout this paper that a bill of rights is a weak
weapon against abuses of civil liberty unless in its application the court has
all the necessary skills. As it stands today the marksmanship of the court is
not up to the sophistication of the weapon.
IV
CASE ANALYSIS
On April 8th, 1967, Joseph Drybones, a Dogrib Indian, was found
intoxicated in the lobby of Yellowstone's Old Stope Hotel. He was charged
and convicted 0 under section 94(b) of the Indian Act 8l which provides:
"s. 94. An
(a)
(b)
(c)

Indian who
has intoxicants in his possession,
isintoxicated, or
makes or manufactures intoxicants off a reserve, is guilty of an
offense and is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not less than
ten dollars and not more than fifty dollars or to imprisonment for
a term not exceeding three months or to both fine and imprisonment."

In the Northwest Territories a non-Indian is liable to criminal punish-

ment for being intoxicated in a public place. However his punishment is less
in that there is no maximum fine provided, and the maximum term of imprisonment is thirty days. 82 Moreover there are no Indian reserves in the Northwest Territories so that an Indian could be convicted if he was found intoxicated in his own home. Such conduct by a non-Indian is not punishable.
Drybones successfully appealled his conviction before Judge Morrow of
the Northwest Territories Territorial Court. 83 The basis of his decision was
that section 94(b) was inoperative since it conflicted with section l(b) of
the Bill of Rights in that it deprived Drybones of equality before the law
80

Justice of the Peace John Andrew Thompson, April 10, 1967.
S R.S.C. 1952, ch. 149.
82
Liquor Ordinance, R.O.N.W.T. 1956, c. 60, s. 19 (1).
83 June 5, 1967.
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because it provided for harsher penalties in the Northwest Territories for
liquor offenses for Indians than apply to anyone else. Section 1(b) of the
Bill of Rights provides:
"s.1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada there have existed
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental
freedoms, namely:
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection of
the law;"

The Crown appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of the Northwest
Territories which upheld Judge Morrow's decision.Y It further appealed to
the Supreme Court of Canada which upheld the lower courts' decisions by a
majority vote of six to three.85
Justice Ritchie wrote the majority opinion of the Court. 86 He accepted
the lower courts' findings that the defendant was deprived of his right to
equality before the law. He then proceeded to deal with the first submission
of the appellant. It was contended that the decision of the court below made
the question of whether s.94(b) has been rendered inoperative by the Bill
dependent upon whether or not the law of any province or territory makes it
an offense to be intoxicated otherwise than in a public place. Hence its
operation could therefore not only vary from place to place in Canada, but
also from time to time depending upon amendments which might be made to
the provincial or territorial legislation. Ritchie rather inadequately and summarily dismisses this argument by stating that "the ordinance in question is
a law of Canada within the meaning of s.5(2) of the Bill of Rights, and it
is a law of general application in the Territories, whereas the Indian Act, is,
of course, also a law of Canada although it has special application to Indians
alone." 87
Here Ritchie is clearly evading a key issue. What if Drybones was convicted in a province so that the Indian Act would be compared to provincial
legislation rather than federal territorial legislation? In other words does
"equality before the law" require that an Indian be treated equally under the
Indian Act as a non-Indian is treated under provincial legislation? As the Bill
does not apply to provincial legislation, the answer to this seems unclear.
However the concept of "equal protection of the law" has developed in the
United States so that it only applies to equal protection before the laws of
the same sovereign body. This would seem to dispose of the issue. Ritchie
should have more adequately dealt with this problem. Parliament has declared
the right. It is up to the Court to give meaning to the Bill by defining the
scope of these rights.
Next Ritchie addresses himself to the argument that section 2 of the Bill
is only a rule of construction which does not have the effect of repealing inconsistent legislation. Ritchie lays down two reasons for rejecting this approach. First he accepts the reasoning of Cartwright in the Robertson case
84 August 25, 1967.
85 [1970] S.C.R. 282.
80 Id., Fauteux, Martland, Judson, Hall, Spence, J.J. concurring.
8
TId. at 291.
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which rejected this approach. 88 Ironically in the case under discussion, Cartwright has refuted this position. Secondly, Ritchie feels that the non obstante
clause of section 2 would become superfluous if this approach were accepted
because an inconsistent Act would operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights
anyway. It is submitted that Ritchie has approached this problem in a common sense way. The Bill, in other words, makes no sense if the alternative
interpretation is accepted. However a philosophical statement of the principles
and purposes of the Bill of Rights is lacking. Such a statement would justify
the interpretation accepted by Ritchie as well as lay down some guidance for
the future application of the Bill. Finally, as you will see, if the parliamentary
debates were referred to, Ritchie could have disposed of this issue summarily.
Ritchie then proceeded to deal with the argument that the Bill of Rights
must have reference to and be circumscribed by the laws of Canada as they
existed on the date of its enactment. In other words section 1 (b) of the Bill
is to be treated as being limited or affected by section 94(b) of the Indian
Act. Ironically this argument is based upon a statement by Ritchie in the
Robertson case (supra):
"It is to be noted at the outset that the Canadian Bill of Rights is not concerned
with 'human rights and fundamental freedoms' in any abstract sense but rather
with such rights and freedoms as existed in Canada immediately before the
statute was enacted (see also s. 5(1) ). It is therefore the 'religious freedom'
then existing in this country that is safeguarded by the provisions of s. 2..."

Needless to say this statement could not be accepted as a guide in interpreting
a bill of rights declaring rights and freedoms which expand or contract as
changing social conditions require. Of course this reasoning only applies if
these rights are not absolute, which is certainly the case in Canada.
Ritchie rejects this reasoning for two reasons. First, in the Robertson
case, the majority did not find conflict with the Bill of Rights. Therefore it
cannot be used as authority in the present case which involves conflicting
legislation. Secondly, this argument is contrary to section 5(2) of the Bill
which makes it applicable to every "Act of the Parliament of Canada enacted
before or after the coming into face of this Act." If rights are to be circumscribed by previous legislation then this provision becomes meaningless. Once
again Ritchie applies a good common sense approach. But once more he fails
to provide future courts with a philosophical basis for the application of the
Bill. However it is interesting to see that Ritchie has gone one step further
than Cartwright in his interpretation. In the construction of the provision in
question Ritchie is referring to other provisions in the Bill. In other words he
is interpreting a provision in the context of the whole Bill rathen than just
construing each provision literally. But it is suggested that this is not enough.
Statutory construction of a bill of rights must involve an analysis of philosophical, political, social and economic factors as well as legal.
The final argument with which Ritchie deals has to do with the scope of
the right in question. In R. v. Gonzales"9 Tysoe J.A. defined the right of
equality before the law in the following words:
"A right of every person to whom a particularlaw relates or extends, no matter
what may be a person's race, national origin, colour, religion or sex, to stand on
8

8Robertson and Rosetanni v. The Queen, [1963] S.C.R. 651,8 9 (1962), 132 C.C.C.
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an equal footing with every other person to whom a particular law relates or
extends and a right to the protection of the law."
(The italics are Mr. Justice Tysoe's)

Ritchie rejects this definition because of the implications of such holding:
I cannot agree with this interpretation pursuant to which it seems to me that
the most glaring discriminatory legislation against a racial group would have to be
construed as recognizing the right of each of its individual members "to equality
before the law", so long as all the other members are being discriminated against
in the same way.90

In his argument Ritchie does give a very general definition of the right in
issue:
...I think that s.l(b) means at least that no individual or group of individuals
is to be treated more harshly than another under that law, and I am therefore of
the opinion that an individual is denied equality before the law if it is made an
offence punishable at law, on account of his race, for him to do something
which his fellow Canadians are free to do without having committed any offense
or having been made subject to any penalty.

Finally after having read the two dissenting opinions Ritchie cautiously
lays down a qualification to his judgment:
It appears to me to be desirable to make it plain that these reasons for judgment
are limited to a situation in which, under the laws of Canada,it is made an offence
punishable at law on account of race, for a person to do something which all
Canadians who are not members of that race may do with impunity; in my opinion the same considerations do not by any means apply to all the provisions of
the Indian Act. 92 (Italics mine)

In so doing he has indirectly answered the question that was posed earlier.
That is, that the right of equality before the law does not require that an
Indian be treated equally under the Indian Act as a non-Indian under provincial law. The unfortunate impact of this holding is that section 94(b) is
probably still operative in the provinces. But it seems clear that the importance of the majority decision is not its effect on the constitutional position

of the Indian but its effect on the concept of judicial review in Canada.
In Chief Justice Cartwright's dissenting opinion he assumes that section

94(b) infringes the right of the defendant to equality before the law. He
seems satisfied to proceed on this assumption without questioning the implications of such holding. The Chief Justice then goes on to face the main
issue of the case as he sees it:
In these circumstances the choice open to us is to give effect to the section
according to its plain meaning or to declare it inoperative, that is to say, to
declare that the Indian Act is pro tanto repealed by the Bill.93

In my opinion Cartwright has mis-stated the issue in a manner that is
unfavourable to the defendant. He states that if the latter approach is accepted
then the Indian Act is pro tanto repealed. If such was the case then a court
would be chary of using this approach because of its grave implications. But
such a holding would be contrary to established rules of interpretation deveooDrybones, at 297.
01 Id. at 297.
02 Id. at 298.
o3 Id. at 286.
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loped in Canadian constitutional law. A court should not formulate a
rule of constitutional law broader than is required by the precise
facts to which it is to be applied."' Hence only section 94(b) of the Indian
Act would be rendered inoperative by an application of the Bill of Rights.
Cartwright suggests three reasons to show that the Bill does not have
the effect of repealing an inconsistent statute. First, he accepts the reasoning
of Davey, J.A. in Regina v. Gonzales:
In so far as existing legislation does not offend against any of the matters
specifically mentioned in clauses (a) to (g) of s.2, but is said to otherwise
infringe upon some of the human rights and fundamental freedoms declared in
s.1, in my opinion the section does not repeal such legislation either expressly
or by implication. On the contrary, it expressly recognizes the continued existence
of such legislation, but provides that it shall be construed and applied so as not
to derogate from those rights and freedoms. By that it seems merely to provide
a canon or rule of interpretation for such legislation. The very language of
s. 2, "be so construed and applied as not to abrogate' assumes that the prior Act
may be sensibly construed and applied in a way that will avoid derogating from
the rights and freedoms declared in s.1. If the prior legislation cannot be so
construed and applied sensibly, then the effect of s. 2 is 95exhausted, and the prior
legislation must prevail according to its plain meaning.

Curiously this was the reasoning which Cartwright had rejected seven years
earlier in the Robertson case (supra). His change of mind is due to the realization that "the Bill directs the courts to apply such a law not to refuse to
apply it." This is inferred from the opening words of section 2 that "Every
law of Canada shall ... be so construed and applied as not to abrogate ... "
I would suggest that this is the type of literal interpretation and mechanical
application of law that our legal system should not tolerate especially when
a court is administering a bill of rights. It is the philosophical principles that
the Bill declares with which a court should be concerned, rather than the
words. Perhaps the positivist strain is too entrenched in the Canadian judiciary to enable it to apply a normative document like a bill of rights. However
it is submitted that even a mechanical application of the Bill requires that a
court declare inconsistent legislation inoperative. Cartwright does not give
enough weight to the closing words of section 2, i.e. "... no law of Canada
shall be construed or applied so as to ... " This clause in particular refers to
specific, enumerated breaches of natural justice but it would be unreasonable
to suggest that it did not also apply to the declared rights enumerated in
section 1. Hence the Court has been directed by Parliament not to apply an
inconsistent piece of legislation. Moreover, there is a traditional canon of
construction that a statute should be construed so as not to interfere with the
rights of individuals. 98 It is not reasonable to suggest that Parliament only
intended section 2 to be a canon of construction when such a canon already
existed.
Even though we can achieve a desirable result using the latter approach,
I maintain that it is inadequate in interpreting a political document like a bill
94
Laskin, supra note 49, at 145. Notice that this is also the American approach;
see Steamship Co. v. Emigration Commissioners, 113 U.S. 33.
95
Supra note 89, at 239.
96 See J. Willis, Statutory Interpretation in a Nutshell, (1938), 16 Can. Bar Rev.
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of rights. It has been suggested in this paper that ordinary rules of statutory
construction should not apply in constitutional cases. 97 The reasoning of this
suggestion has been concisely given in the following words:
...statutes are by no means all of one kind and that both judicial practise and
principle indicate important differences between the rules of interpretation appropriate to different types of statutes. An eminently political and general documen, such as a constitution, is not and cannot be treated in the same way as
a statute concerned with the registration of land or with criminal procedure. 98

One improvement that I would recommend is that the Court should
refer to more external aids in interpreting political documents. The value of
extrinsic aids has been recognized by the Supreme Court of Canada:
In certain cases, in order to avoid confusion extraneous evidence is required to
facilitate the analysis of legislative enactments, and thus disclose their aims which
otherwise would remain obscure or completely concealed. The true purposes and
effect of legislation, when revealed to the courts, are indeed very precious elements which must be considered in order to discover its real substance. 99

Although the Court was referring to evidence as to the effect of the impugned
legislation, I believe that this reasoning should be extended to the legislative
history of statutes as a means of discerning the purpose of the legislation in
question. More particularly I am concerned with the admissibility of the evidence of parliamentary debates or legislative committee hearings. Presently

such evidence is inadmissible in Canadian courts.' 00 They have followed the
British rule of total exclusion of evidence of legislative history. 1 1 This tradition is exemplified in the following obiter dicta of Lord Wright:
It is clear that the language of a Minister of the Crown in proposing in Parliament a measure which eventually becomes law is inadmissible... 102

It is conceded that there are limitations in the use of these external aids. For
instance Justice Frankfurter warned that "Spurious use of legislative history
must not swallow the legislation so as to give point to the quip that only
when the legislative history is doubtful do you go to the statute."' 0 3 However
the possibility of abuse should not preclude its admission in evidence when
there is some ambiguity in the words of the statute as to its purpose as
there is in the case at hand. This is not to say that the legislative history is
07 Some jurists would suggest that cases arising under the Bill of Rights are not
"constitutional" because that document is only an ordinary statute. However it is suggested that the Bill is an integral part of our constitutional system as is other statutory or
common law which is also outside the B.N.A. Act.
08W. Friedmann, Judges, Politics and the Law, (1951), 29 Can. Bar Rev. 811, 827.
00 See Taschereau J. in Turner's Dairy Ltd. v. Lower Mainland Dairy Products
Board [1947] S.C.R. 573, 583.
100 The Canadian position was posited by the obiter dicta of Locke, J.in Texanda
Mines Ltd. v. A.G.B.C. [1960] S.C.R. 713 reaffirmed in ration decidendi in A.G. Canada
v. Reader's Digest Association (Can.) Ltd. [1961] S.C.R. 775.
01

1 For a hesitant defense of this tradition see C. K. Allen, Law in the Making,

(Oxford U. Press, 7th ed. 1964), 510-515. For a less hesitant criticism see Davies, The
Interpretation of Statutes in the Light of Their Policy by English Courts, (1935), 35
Col. L. Rev. 519.
102
Assam Railways and Trading Co. Ltd. v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue,
[1935] A.C. 445, 457.
103 F. Frankfurter, Some Reflection on the Reading of Statutes, (1947), 47 Col.
L. Rev. 527, 543.
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conclusive evidence of parliamentary intention. The Court would have the
discretion to give this evidence the weight which it deems appropriate. 10 4
If the parliamentary debates were referred to in this case the Court
would have discovered that Parliament had already addressed itself to this
issue. Mr. Martin (L, Essex East) of the Opposition proposed an amendment
to the Bill of Rights which would have decided this issue:
We want a bill of rights that will see to it that any inconsistent legislation, which
violates any of the provisions of the bill, will be inoperative. 105

He introduced into the record the views of Mr. Donald McInness, the then
vice-president of the Canadian Bar Association, who postulated that the words
of section 2 could be interpreted in either of two ways. First, it could be
interpreted as a simple rule of construction which would not have the effect
of revoking inconsistent legislation. Needless to say this is the approach
adopted by Cartwright. Or, it could have the effect of repealing legislation
as far as it is contradictory to the Bill.
Mr. Fulton, the then Minister of Justice, rejected Mr. Martin's proposed
amendment because he thought the words of section 2 were satisfactory to
require a court to adopt the latter approach. In so doing the Minister laid
down the approach that a court should implement in applying the Bill:
They will then have a look at the section or provision in question and say first,
does this statute have within it an express declaration that it operates notwithstanding the bill of rights? If the answer to that question be no, it does not
contain such an express provision, they would then look at the question of
whether or not the provision of the statute which is before them does contravene
the bill of rights. If the answer to that question be yes, then they would say, by
virtue of the bill of rights we are directed not to give that statute or provision
that construction, interpretation or application; in fact, we are directed not to
apply it in a manner which will contravene the bill of rights.' 06

In a recent article E. A. Driedger, the Chief Parliamentary Draftsman at the
time of the enactment of the Bill, and who drew its actual provisions, said:
The effect of this provision (i.e. section 2) therefore would appear to abrogate
the two rules of inconsistency, namely, that a particular statute
overrides a
general statute and that a later statute overrides an earlier one.1 07

Hence the priority rules for the particular over the general, or the later over

the earlier, do not apply in cases involving the Bill of Rights which has an
overriding effect.
It is unfortunate that the Court should waste its resources on an issue
already decided by Parliament. Of course the Court is not alone to blame. It
is submitted that the Bill of Rights is a poorly drafted piece of legislation. As
is so often the case, the legislation before the Court does not clearly declare
legislative intent. This gives credence to the argument that these external
10 4 For an excellent discussion of the issues here in concern see Hart and Sacks,
The Legal Process (tenth ed. 1958) pp. 1243-1286.
105 Parl. Deb. 1960 Vol. VII, 7474.
10 6 Id. at 7476.
107 E. A. Driedger, The Canadian Bill of Rights, in Contemporary Problems of

Public Law in Canada, 0. E. Lang (ed.) U. of T. Press, Toronto, 1968, 37.
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aids should be available to courts in the construction of all statutes, or at
least in the construction of political documents which are necessarily expressed
in general terms.
Canadian courts have placed themselves in a mechanistic trap. They
have confined themselves by a short-sighted philosophy of judicial restraint.
They extract the worst of that philosophy while disregarding its merits. The
Court is very chary of policy making. It feels that as soon as it opens itself
to such external aids, it adopts the characteristics of a policy maker. It is
concerned with legislative words and not legislative policy. However in its
lack of insight, the Court has not realized that these external aids are useful
in discerning legislative intention. More importantly it has not realized that
a philosophy of judicial restraint does not preclude the use of judicial creativity. Judges should be restrained by the limits of the power granted to them
and by the limits of the adjudicative process, not by an antiquated legal philosophy which has remained static in a dynamic society.
Cartwright's next reason for his interpretation is that "it must not be
forgotten that the responsibility (i.e. of declaring inconsistent legislation
inoperative) ...if imposed at all, is imposed upon every justice of the peace,
magistrate and judge of any court in the country who is called upon to apply
a Statute of Canada, or any order, rule or regulation made thereunder."108
Presumably such lower court judges should not have such responsibility. But
is not this the responsibility that any such judge has in any ordinary constitutional case? A magistrate in traffic court may declare a federal regulation
ultra vires if he finds it to be "in relation to" a provincial subject matter. Why
is he less competent to declare federal legislation inoperative which he finds
to be inconsistent with the Bill of Rights? In any case there is always a court
of appeal to oversee the administration of the Bill.
Finally Cartwright feels that if Parliament had intended to give the Court
such power, it would have done so in explicit language. The arguments in
favour of external aids apply to this reason also. Moreover the Court has the
power to declare inoperative a piece of legislation if the enacting legislature
does not have the requisite constitutional powers. In no legislation is the
Court explicitly given this power. It has developed by convention in our constitutional system. Although the Court is a creature of Parliament, it must not
feel compelled to only act on the explicit direction of its creator. It has an
area of discretion in which to work. It has the major responsibility of directing
its own development. It has the obligation of providing our legal system with
an appropriate "dispute-settling mechanism" capable of keeping our constitutional system answerable to the needs of a changing society. Parliamentary
sovereignty does not mean that Parliament is alone responsible for the
development of our legal system.
Mr. Justice Pigeon in his dissenting opinion gives four reasons to show
that Parliament has not given the Court such powers. His primary reason is
that the opening words of section 1 make it clear that the declared freedoms
in the Bill are to be circumscribed by the existing legislation at the date of
the enactment of the Bill. The key words are that the enumerated rights and
10 8 Drybones, 287-88.
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freedoms "have existed and shall continue to exist.. ." He feels that these
rights and freedoms are not legal concepts of precise and invariable content.
By these words Parliament has supplied a large measure of precisions. Hence
the implication of his decision is that the Bill does not affect previous conflicting legislation because the scope of freedom provided for in this legislation defines the scope of the freedom provided for in the Bill of Rights.
This argument must be rejected for reasons already discussed. Rights
and freedoms in a liberal democratic society are flexible concepts. By confining them to the scope which they possessed on a specific date is arbitrarily
unreasonable. Moreover with Pigeon's interpretation, section 5(2) of the Bill
which defines a law of Canada as any Act "enacted before or after the coming into force of this Act .. ." becomes meaningless. Professor Tarnopolsky
points out that this position is untenable because any subsequent expansion
by Parliament of these rights and freedoms as they existed in 1960 could
later be abrogated despite the existence of our Bill of Rights. 109 Finally, if
Pigeon had referred to the Debates he would have seen that his position was
wrong. The then Prime Minister, Mr. Diefenbaker, made the following statement which described the effect of section 2. He also demonstrated that the
Bill of Rights is not to be circumscribed by the laws of Canada as they
existed on the date of the Bill's enactment:
Furthermore, if any of these several rights should be violated under legislation
now existing, the courts in interpreting the particular laws or statutes which have
been passed will hereafter, if this bill is passed, be required to interpret those
statutes of today in the light of the fact that whenever there is a violation of
any of these declarations or freedoms, the statute in question is to that extent
non-operative and was never intended to be so operative." 0
(italics mine)

Secondly Pigeon agrees with Cartwright that section 2 only lays down
a rule of construction which does not have the effect of revoking conflicting
legislation.' 1 However he does concede that the non obstante clause of section 2 is a strong argument against his interpretation. But then he reverts
back to his first argument and states that there can never be any necessity
for declaring existing legislation inoperative as coming in conflict with the
rights and freedoms defined in the Bill seeing that these are declared as existing in them. He concludes that this is more compelling than the effect of the
non obstante clause.
Pigeon's reasoning leaves one big gap. What if the legislation in question
has been enacted after the enactment of the Bill so that the rights declared
in it could not possibly be so circumscribed? Does the Court then have the
power to overrule this subsequent legislation if it conflicts with the Bill? In
other words does the effect of section 2 depend on whether the legislation was
109 Tarnopolsky, supra note 5, at 113.
110 Parl. Deb. 1960 Vol. V, 5646.
111 Curiously this is the position taken by Pigeon before his appointment to the
Court. See The Bill of Rights and the B.NM.A. Act, (1959), 37 Can. Bar Rev. 66, 72.
It was also the position of Laskin before his appointment to the Court which was after
the Drybones decision. See An Inquiry into the Diefenbaker Bill of Rights (1959),
37 Can. Bar Rev. 77, 130-32.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 9, NO. 3

passed before or after 1960? Had Pigeon referred to the Debates, he would
not have been forced to take such an unreasonable position on this decided
issue.
Thirdly Pigeon looks at the impact of the majority decision. Indians are
now to be subject in every province to the same rules of law as all others
in every particular not merely on the question of drunkeness. "Outside the
territories, provincial jurisdiction over education and health facilities would
make it very difficult for federal authorities to provide such facilities to Indians
without "discrimination" as understood in the court below." 2 Several comments can be made on this argument. Is this the kind of matter that we
want judges to look at? Are they competent to decide whether Parliament can
provide such facilities for Indians? This dangerously sounds like policy making. It is interesting to see that the judges who are most frightened of policymaking in reality are the ones who concern themselves with policy questions.
Also, as we have seen, a close analysis of the majority position would not
yield the effects which Pigeon foresees. Ritchie clearly confined his decision to
the case where two pieces of federal legislation conflicted. Pigeon foresees
effects resulting from a conflict of provincial and federal legislation. As was
stated above, equality before the law means equality under the laws of the
same sovereign body.
Finally Pigeon argues that if Parliament had intended to give the courts
such new powers then it would have done so in clear language. For this position Pigeon relies on an old common law maxim. This is the presumption
against implicit alteration of the law; Parliament must not be presumed to
depart from the existing law any further than expressly state." 3 This maxim
has value when there is ambiguity in the statutory language. However its
value diminshes in the context of the case at hand because the introduction
of a bill of rights in a parliamentary system is a major alteration in the law.
An interpretation of the Bill must be made in this context. Old maxims are
not adequate justification for such interpretations. It is to the purposes,
principles and policies of a bill of rights that a judge's mind should be directed
in its interpretation.
Curiously the judges who are only willing to discern legislative intent
from the clear words of the statute are the judges who have mis-interpreted
the intention of Parliament in this case, as the Debates show. Moreover it is
these same judges who are most frightened of judicial law making. As we
see, if accepted their approach would have made law contrary to the wishes
of Parliament. It is extremely ironic that the dissenting judges in this case are
the judicial activists on our Court. Hence we can see that a mechanical application of law is no guarantee that judges will be be restrained by the limits
of the legal powers which were granted to them. This unrestrained judicial
action is unintentional but it will continue as long as Canadian jurisprudence
does not place a premium on judicial creativity. Mechanistic positivism is
inadequate not only because it fails in keeping the law in tune with prevailing
social conditions but also because it may inhibit our judiciary from carrying
1 2 Drybones,

303.
I's See Maxwell, On Interpretationof Statutes, (9th ed.), 84 cited in Duchesneau v.
Cook [1955] S.C.R. 207, 215.

1971]

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

out the intentions of Parliament. This is the supreme paradox which most
Canadian judges, jurists and lawyers have failed to grasp and why in turn
they have provided our technological society with an antiquated jurisprudence.
At this time we should look back and make some general comments
from our analysis. In my opinion it must be conceded that the approach of
the Court, including the majority, is inadequate. The decision provided no
guidelines for the application of the Bill of Rights in lower courts. It completely lacked a balancing of interests which is called for in every civil liberties question since these rights are not absolute. The cost of infringing an
individual's rights must be weighed against the benefit to be derived from
the state policy or actions which cause the infringement. The Court should
have questioned whether there were justifiable policy reasons for treating
Indians differently than other Canadians. I am not inferring that this was not
a complex question to resolve. I am suggesting that this was the appropriate
question to ask in order to settle the dispute before the Court. Instead of
applying its resources to this basic question the Court has dwelled on an
issue which had already been decided by the legislature. As long as the Court
is not prepared to implement this type of analysis, then I suggest it is incompetent to apply the present Bill of Rights, let alone the more comprehensive
bill which the Prime Minister and his followers recommend.
It should also be mentioned that this decision may have grave consequences on the legislative process. The majority's definition of "equality
before the law" would seem to preclude Parliament from enacting preferential legislation for any group classified on race, national origin, colour, religion or sex. This may have significant effects on future parliamentary activity,
especially in the area of the regulation of the economy. For instance, Drybones would appear to prohibit the treating of foreign-owned corporations
operating in Canada differently from corporations owned and controlled by
Canadians. Moreover this decision seems to have grave implications on existing legislation. It may invalidate much of our Indian legislation as well as
legislative provisions in our electoral laws,114 our immigration laws" 0 , and our
criminal law." 6 As well Drybones will likely have a deleterious impact on the
judicial process. Since it was reported our lower courts have been inundated
with cases involving the Bill of Rights. Unfortunately they have no guidelines
to refer in its administration.
In its decision, the Court did not recognize that in certain cases legislative classification is justifiable even if it is based on one of the above mentioned categories. In the United States the fourteenth Amendment has not
precluded such classification:
It is clear that the demand for equal protection cannot be a demand that laws
apply universally to all persons. The legislature, if it is to act at all, must impose
upon or grant special benefits to special groups or classes of
special burdens
7
individuals.' 1
114 See Canada Elections Act, R.S.C. 1952 c. 39 s. 14.

115 See Immigration Act, R.S.C. 1952 c. 325.
116 See Criminal Code, S. C. 1953-54, c. 51, ss. 135, 148.
1171. J. Tussman and J. ten3roek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, (1949), 37

Calif. L. Rev. 341, 343.
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Here the Supreme Court of Canada failed to decide whether there was "reasonable classification". In not doing so, it has created uncertainty in our law.
As to the near future I would suggest that the Court will be very conservative in the assertion of its new power. It will be very chary of striking
down federal legislation unless the conflict of legislation is as blatant as it
thought it was in the case under discussion. Perhaps this is fortunate since it
appears that the Court presently lacks the requisite philosophical approach
to apply a bill of rights. It is to this approach that we shall now turn in the
conclusion of this paper.
V
CONCLUSION

-

A SUGGESTED APPROACH

It would be remiss of me if I did not attempt to suggest an approach that
the Court could take in interpreting the Bill of Rights. In doing this I would
like to briefly elaborate upon my conception of the role of the Court which
is probably evident to the reader by now.
In a liberal democratic society the role of a court as a policy maker
must be limited. This is because of the aforementioned institutional limitations of adjudication as well as the legal values that are gained when a court
adheres to a policy of stare decisis.11 However a court must be creative
within the confines of the restraints set down by our legal system. The tools
with which a court deals (legal rules, principles and policies) are purposive
instruments which must be applied creatively to particular fact situations. In
interpreting a legal rule a court must impute the social purpose which this
rule expresses. In no other way can the law remain answerable to the needs
of people in a society of rapid social change.
I suggest that the institutional role of a judge is as dynamic as the law
that he applies. In my opinion there are a number of factors which dictate the
degree of creativity that is open to a judge in his decision making. The most
important of these is the body of law that the court is applying. It seems
reasonable that a court should be more creative in developing the decisional
law than the statutory law. Our legal system has delegated this responsibility
to the courts because they have the resources that are required in the development of the common law. In other words the courts are better suited than the
legislature for this role.
However this does not preclude creativity in the judicial task of statutory
interpretation. In this area, as well, the degree of creativity required of a
court is dependent upon the statute that is being interpreted. When a statute
relates to an area of the law that the court has traditionally developed, then
it must be more creative in its interpretation. For instance, in the interpretation of The Negligence Act and The Broadcasting Act, the court must be
more prepared to defer to the legislature in the latter case. The court has
historically developed the law of torts while communications policy must be
11 8

For excellent discussions of these legal values see Hart and Sacks, supra note

104, at 587-88 and P.C. Weiler, supra note 78, at 9- 29.
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admitted to be primarily within the domain of the legislature. Moreover a
court should be more creative when dealing with legislation expressed in
general terms rather than specific. Needless to say, in the former case the
legislature has allocated more discretionary power to the court than in the
latter.
Now we must relate this discussion to the role of the court in the interpretation of a bill of rights. As we have seen a bill of rights has a major
effect on the institutional allocation of power in our political system. It must
be admitted that a bill increases the power of a court in a parliamentary
system. In other words, Parliament in its wisdom has made the policy decision
to give the court a greater role to play in the political system. In accepting
this new responsibility the court must be prepared to be creative in its application of the bill. Moreover since the bill is expressed in such general terms
the degree of creativity open to a court is great.
The question now is whether our court is ready to accept this new
responsibility. From the discussion in other parts of this paper it is apparent
that I have concluded that it is not so prepared. Therefore we must provide
an approach which is commensurate with the court's present competence and
which is flexible enough to be the basis of the approach that is required in the
application of a bill of rights. Of course the requisite approach is an idyllic
notion which can never be reached but only be striven toward.
The rights declared in the Bill of Rights have been classified as follows:110
political liberties - freedoms of religion, speech, assembly and press (section
1(c) - (f) ); economic liberties - the right to own property, the right not
to be deprived thereof without due process, freedom of contract etc. (section
1(a)); legal liberties - freedom from arbitrary arrest, right to fair hearing,
access to counsel etc. (sections l(a), 2(a) - (g) ); egalitarian liberties equality before the law (section 1(b) ). Because of the inherent nature of
these rights and because of the competence of the court I would suggest that
the degree of creativity open to a court is dependent upon the right which it
is expounding. At this time the court should be most active when it is defining
legal liberties. Many of the rights declared in sections 1(a) and 2(a) - (g)
have been created and expanded by the courts and hence are more susceptible
to development by the judiciary. 120 Furthermore, it is likely that these rights
involve the kinds of issues with which the electorate feels the court should
deal. Hence the problem of legitimizing the court's decision will be less even
119 See Laskin, supra note 111.

120 Even Professor Bickel, a stalwart of judicial restraint, would allow the Court
freedom in reforming the criminal process. See A. Bickel, The Supreme Court and The
Idea of Progress, (1970) p. 32. This paper does not suggest that the issues arising in a
"legal liberties" case are simple policy questions which a court can easily resolve. Such

notions have been disproven in Goldberg and Dershowitz Declaring the Death Penalty

Unconstitutional, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 1773, 1798-1802 (1970). However, it is submitted
that a court is more competent to deal with these issues than those arising in other
civil liberties cases and is more competent than the legislature to piecemeally develop
this procedural area.
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though the court may in fact be "legislating". 121 The exposition of the other
three classes of liberty involve broad policy questions with which the court
is not necessarily competent to deal, at least presently. This is not to say that
the court should not define and expand this class of liberty. It is only to
suggest that in dealing with these liberties, the court should be more ready
to defer to the legislature. That is to say that it should be less likely to find
conflict with the Bill of Rights. But it must be emphasized that this does not
preclude a more active role in these areas for the court in the future. As has
been stated above, the court's competence to deal with these issues may increase with experience. Moreover in one of these areas - that of political
liberties - it has a firm base from which to work, i.e. the "implicit bill of
rights" developed by the Supreme Court in the 1950's.
The model that we are about to discuss attempts to create an atmosphere
or mood in which three judicial attributes are enhanced. First, it emphasizes
the collaborative role that the court is to play with the legislature.. Secondly,
it outlines a process of decision making in which a court must be creative.
Finally, the model sets forth a framework in which the judicial decision is
made in light of the institutional limits of adjudication that we discussed
above. Therefore the role of the court must be limited by these factors.
In deciding whether the legislation in question is in conflict with the
Bill of Rights, the first step is the inference of statutory purpose. I would
suggest that the court implement the approach developed by Hart and
Sacks.122 As was stated above, this would require the court to liberalize its
present rules of evidence. Since this model envisages a court balancing
different interests and values it is imperative that it discern the "true" purpose of the legislation because that purpose is an expression of the interests
that the legislature is attempting to accommodate and hence an expression of
the value which the legislature is trying to achieve.
In the second stage the court would evaluate the legitimacy of the
statutory purpose. In other words the court would ask whether this is a
reasonable goal for the legislature to achieve. To answer this the court would
have to question whether there is in reality an evil or problem with which
the state should be concerned. Hence the court would have to look at the
legislative facts upon which the statutory purpose is based.'2 3 In evaluating
121 This submission might be seriously questioned because of the American experience. It must be conceded that the American Court's actions in the area of criminal
procedure caused a great deal of adverse public reaction. However we must not infer
too much from this phenomenon. The Supreme Court was most active at a time when
the crime rate was high. The Court was a very convenient scapegoat for this crisis in
"law and order". The public was persuaded that the Court caused, or at least enhanced
this increased criminal activity, although this relationship was never empirically proved.
Such conditions do not exist in Canada and hence the American experience is of minimal
value to us. Moreover the rights enumerated in section 2 of the Canadian Bill are much
more specific than the due process clause of the American Bill. The substantive and
procedural goals are more clearly delineated. In other words, the Canadian Court has
clearer standards and hence its decisions will be more easily legitimated.
122 Hart and Sacks, supra note 104, Ch. VII.
123 In past constitutional cases, Canadian courts have exercised such powers - see
Fort Frances Pulp and Paper Co. Ltd. v. Manitoba Free Press Co. [1923] A.C. 695;
Co-operative Committee on Japanese Canadians v. A. G. Canada [19471 A. C. 87.
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the legitimacy of the statutory purpose the court must be aware of its own
limits as a policy maker. But it must be creative in assessing its own competence to question the legitimacy of the statutory purpose. As was said before
the court's competence to act is dependent upon the problem with which it
deals. For instance, I would suggest that a court is more competent to question
whether a privilege as to self-incrimination impedes the administration of
justice than whether preferential economic policies are necessary for the
health of the economy. The court must be more ready to defer to the legislature in the latter case. If it does not and the court rejects the legitimacy of the
statutory purpose then the matter is ended and the court must declare the
legislation inoperative. If the court accepts its legitimacy then it must proceed
to the final stage of the process.
The third step involves an evaluation of the means of effecting the legitimate statutory purpose. In effect a benefit-cost analysis of the legislation is
called of the court at this time. The court must decide whether the social
value gained by the implementation of this legislation is greater than the
social value lost through its infringement on civil liberty. In answering this I
suggest that the court look at the following considerations which are by no
means exclusive. What is the probability that this legislation will in fact eradicate the evil or danger in question? What is the degree of infringement on
the liberty in question? Are there alternative and reasonable means to effect
the same purpose in a less onerous way? Once again the court must make
this evaluation in light of its institutional limitations. If it accepts the legitimacy of the legislative means then it has found no conflict with the Bill of
Rights and the legislation is upheld. Otherwise there is conflict and the legislation must be declared inoperative.
At this point it might be helpful to apply the proposed model to the case
under discussion. As we saw in the case analysis, section 94(b) of the Indian
Act appeared to treat Indians unequally in the Northwest Territories because
it provided for harsher penalties for liquor offenses than apply to non-Indians.
As well the Indian was penalized for conduct which would not make a nonIndian liable to punishment.
In order to decide whether this deprived Drybones of equality before the
law, the court should have first inferred the purpose of section 94(b). Unfortunately counsel in this case did not give evidence of the statutory purpose
nor did the Supreme Court even allude to it. The policy reasons why our
society has so restricted the use of liquor by Indians has been described by
Justice Douglas in the following words:
Experience shows that liquor has a devastating effect on the North American
Indian and Eskimo. It is, therefore, commonly provided in the United States and
Canada that no liquor should be sold to those races. Other regulations based on
race may likewise be justified by reason of the special traits of those races, such,
for example, as their susceptibility to particular diseases. What at first blush may
seem to be an invidious discrimination may on analysis be found to have plausible grounds justifying it.124

Now that the court has inferred the statutory purpose it must then evaluate its legitimacy. It should question the legislative facts upon which this
124W. Douglas, We the fudges, 399 (1956).
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purpose is based. On Douglas' justification section 94(b) would seem to pass
the American test of "reasonable classification" in that the legislative classification (i.e. Indians) is reasonably related to the purpose for which it was
enacted (i.e. to protect Indians from the harmful effects of liquor).125 Similar
with respect to Indians has been upheld in the United
liquor 12legislation
0
States.
In our case the court could defer to the legislative judgment at this
point and agree that this is a reasonable goal for Parliament to achieve. Or
it could ask for biological and cultural evidence to demonstrate that liquor
does in fact cause peculiar individual or social harm to the Indian. I would
suggest that the court should adopt the latter approach in order to discover
whether there is reasonable justification for the legislative purpose. However
once such evidence is produced it should defer to the legislature because it is
less competent to assess such evidence. Of course if the evidence clearly
displays the fallacy of such legislative assumptions, then the court should
reject the legitimacy of the statutory purpose. But if such is not the case then
the court should accept the legitimacy of the purpose of section 94(b).
The court should now proceed to evaluate the means by which Parliament has chosen to effect this purpose. At this stage it would make some of
the following considerations. It must assess the probability that the Indian
will be protected by treating him harsher than the non-Indian. It must question whether the difference in penalty is called for by the seriousness of the
problem. Then the court must consider the costs derived in treating the Indian
differently. It must assess whether this different treatment causes disrespect for
the law since the Indian may deem it to be unreasonable and unjust. The
court could also consider whether all Indians should be treated harsher
because liquor has harmful effects on some Indians. Finally it could canvass
some alternative methods, such as education, which would effect the same
purpose but would not treat the Indian differently before the law.
After weighing all these factors I would suggest that the court would
reject the legislative means chosen to effect the legitimate purpose of Parliament. In effect I believe that the benefits gained by the application of section
94(b) are less than the costs derived in treating the Indian differently. The
efficacy of the model may be questioned in that it reached the same conclusion as the Supreme Court did in fact. But I would suggest that this result
was largely fortuitous. In this paper we are more concerned with the process
of decision making rather than the result of the decision itself. The benefits in
using the analysis called for in this paper should be apparent. It has laid a
practicable framework for lower courts to apply the Bill of Rights. It does not
have the deleterious effects on the legislative process that we discussed above.
It has not created uncertainty but has clarified the law by defining the scope
of "equality before the law". Finally the model has restrained the court to
reasoned decisions. As it stands today, Drybones has placed no restraints on
the court in the application of the Bill of Rights because of the arbitrariness
of its decision.
125 See

Railway Express Agency v. New York (1949), 336 U.S. 106 for an ex-

pression of this test.
120

U.S. v. Nice (1916), 241 U.S. 591; State v. Rorvick (1954), 277 R. 2d 566.
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It is not suggested that judicial decisions based on reason and principle
can ever achieve the "neutrality" that Professor Wechsler calls for.1 27 Judicial
128
decision making is a human activity; a fortiori it involves a value judgment.
Principles necessarily refer to societal value choices. As well, in choosing
what principle to apply in a case, the judge is making a value preference since
there are many principles which he can apply. Indeed in some cases there
may even be conflicting relevant principles from which the judge can choose.
This realistic view of the judicial role has been described by Professor
McDougal in the following way:
The essence of a reasoned decision by the authority of the secular values of a
public order of human dignity is a disciplined appraisal of alternative choices of
immediate consequences in terms of preferred long-term effects, and not in either
the timid foreswearing of concern for immediate consequences or in the quixotic

search for criteria of decision that transcend the world of men and values in
metaphysical fantasy. The reference of legal principles must be either to their
internal-logical arrangement or to the external consequenecs of their application.

It remains mysterious what criteria for decisions a neutral system could offer.'

29

Although this statement abounds in realism, it somehow overstates its case.
It is agreed that pure objectivity is an ideal which can never be achieved.
But this is not reason enough to preclude an attempt to devise an approach
which would encourage and enhance human objectivity. In some ways Professor Wechsler's approach does that. By forcing the judge to use standards
already established in the legal system as the authoritative source of his decisions, his value preferences, although not eliminated, are greatly subdued. 1 30
By now it must be apparent that there are legal values to be gained with such
restraints placed on the judiciary. However a problem does arise when there
are no clear standards by which a judge can refer in his decision. I suggest
that this will often be the case in disputes arising under the Bill of Rights.
At this time it is up to the judge to decide whether the benefits to be gained
in creating new social policy are greater than the losses that will incur by
acting in this manner. Hopefully the model suggested in this paper will in
some way make that decision less difficult.
On firist glance the model which has been proposed appears to be a
radical departure from present judicial review in Canada. But it must be
remembered that in the enactment of the Bill of Rights, Parliament has
intended to increase the powers of the court in the protection of civil liberties.
Moreover I would suggest that the model in many ways is consistent with
traditional constitutional rules of interpretation.
Historically, our courts have asserted that they are not concerned with
the policy embodied in legislation but only with its constitutional validity. 1' 1
12 7H. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, (1959), 73
Harv. L. Rev. 1.
128 See generally A. S. Miller and R. F. Howell, The Myth of Neutrality in ConstitutionalAdjudication, (1960), 27 U. Chi L. Rev. 661.
129M. McDougal, Perspectives for an International Law of Human Dignity, 1959
AM. Soc'y Int'l L. Proceedings, 107, 121 1959.
13 0 See P. C. Weiler, supra note 78 for an article which in my opinion bridges the
gap between these two philosophies.
1' 1 See Laskin, supra note 49 at 189.
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But this proposition is easier to state than apply.132 It would seem that before
an adjudicator could decide whether a legislature has exceeded its jurisdiction,
it must look at the purpose and policy of the legislation. The court must decide
the "what, why and how" of the legislation in order to conclude whether the
constitution has given this legislature such power to so act. Otherwise the
decision of the court would be arbitrary rather than rational. If the court
could not evaluate the purposes and policies of legislation, it would have no
real standard by which to decide constitutional cases. In effect, the evaluation
of legislative policy restrains the court to make a principled and reasoned
decision.
A few examples from our constitutional jurisprudence will perhaps
clarify this argument. In Lower Mainland Dairy Products Board et al. v.
Turner's Dairy Ltd. et al."33 the administrative board in question had made
orders persuant to the scheme set up by the National Products Marketing
(B.C.) Act.13 4 The court had to decide the constitutionality of certain equalization levies designed to effectuate a provincial scheme of price fixing as an
aid in orderly marketing within the province. In order to decide this question
the court had to look at the legislative policy although it did not admit to
this. It decided that, in real purpose and effect, these orders were a colourable
device to equalize the returns to milk producers by taking a portion of their
returns from some and contributing it to others, thereby imposing an indirect
tax, which was forbidden by the constitution.
35
The court similarly acted in A. G. Alberta v. A. G. Canada et al.1 The
Act in question imposed an annual tax on every corporation, other than the
Bank of Canada, incorporated for purposes of doing banking or savings bank
business within the province. Once again the court struck down this provincial
legislation after evaluating its policy. It decided that the purpose and effect
of the Act was not in any real sense true taxation in that it raised revenue
for provincial purposes. The legislation was ultra vires because it was part of a
legislative scheme to rid the province of its federally incorporated institutions.
These cases demonstrate that our courts in fact evaluate legislative policy
to determine whether a legislature has exceeded its powers. They are legitimately concerned with the "what, why and how" of the legislation. This is
what a court would be doing under our model. Only now a court would
question whether Parliament had exceeded its jurisdiction by legislating "in
abrogation of" a declared right rather than by legislating "in relation to" a
subject matter assigned to the provinces. In both instances the court must
evaluate legislative policy in order to determine whether Parliament was legitimately acting within its powers in that its actions merely "affected" a
declared right or a provincial subject matter.
It is not suggested here that judicial review under the Bill is identical to
traditional constitutional judicial review. Above we saw that Parliament intentionally increased the powers of the court in enacting the Bill. But in my
132See Turner's Dairy infra note 133.
233

[1941], 4 D.L.R. 209.

IN R.S.B.C. 1936, c. 165.
185 [1939] A.C 117.
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opinion the difference in approach is one of degree rather than substance.
Historically our judiciary has decided what level of government is best suited
to deal with a social problem. It must be admitted that this is in fact what the
court has done for the division of powers set out in the British North American Act, 1867, in such general terms. This is what the court had done in
the two cases that we just discussed. This is what it has done in the civil
liberties cases that it has decided. We can see this in the following statement
of Cannon, J. in the Alberta Press Bill case:
The federal parliament is the sole authority to curtail, if deemed expedient and
in the public interest, the freedom of the press in discussing public affairs and
the equal rights in that respect of all citizens throughout the Dominion.l8 6

As well this was demonstrated in the Padlock case

37

by Rand:

Parliamentary government postulates a capacity in men, acting freely and under
self-restraints, to govern themselves; and that advance is best served in the degree
achieved of individual liberation from subjective as well as objective shackles.

Under that government the freedom of discussion in Canada, as a subject matter
of legislation, has a unity of interest and significance extending equally to every

part of the Dominion. With such dimensions it is ipso facto exluded from head
16 as a local matter.

Under the Bill of Rights the court would not be deciding which government is best suited to deal with a social problem. It will be deciding whether
government should deal with a particular social problem and if it should then
whether it has dealt with it in a legitimate way. It is suggested that our courts
have traditionally not decided such issues, especially the former, but in fact
some Canadian judges have ventured into this realm of decision-making. In
defining the scope of freedom of expression in the Padlock case, Abbott, I.
made the following comments:
This right cannot be abrogated by a provincial Legislature, and the power of

such Legislature to limit it, is restricted to what may be necessary to protect purely
private rights, such as for example provincial laws of defamation ... Although
it is not necessary, of course, to determine this question for the purposes of the
present appeal, the Canadian Constitution being declared to be similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom, I am also of the opinion that as our

constitutional Act now stands, Parliament itself could not abrogate this right of
discussion and debate. The power of Parliament to limit it is, in my view, restricted to such powers as may be exercisable under its exclusive legislative juris-

diction with respect to criminal 1law
and to make laws for the peace, order and
8
good government of the nation.

In effect Abbott has stated that Parliament can only limit freedom of expression in dealing with certain social activities which relate to some subject
matters over which it has exclusive jurisdiction. Otherwise, not even Parliament can abrogate freedom of expression. In other words, Abbott is postulating that certain social activities are beyond the legislative competence of
Parliament to regulate. The court must decide when this competence is
spent. I think the reader will agree that in essence this is the decision that
this paper calls for under the Bill of Rights.
186 [1938] S.C.R. 100, 146.

187 [1957] S.C.R. 285, 306.
3.881d. at 328.

